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INTRODUCTION
Suppose that drivers A and B are involved in an automobile
accident in which a bystander, C, is also injured. The state in which
the accident occurs is a comparative negligence jurisdiction. A sues
B, and on the advice of counsel, in order to expedite the case,
admits to being twenty percent responsible for the accident. A wins
his suit against B. C then sues A for his injuries, and A denies
responsibility. C claims that A may not attempt to contradict his
earlier assertion, and thus moves for summary judgment for twenty
percent of his damages. The judge finds that A asserted his partial
responsibility for the accident with B, that the prior court accepted
that assertion, and that A is now judicially estopped from denying
twenty percent responsibility for the accident, byproducts of which
were C's injuries. Is it fair to prevent A from disclaiming responsi-
bility for C's injuries in the later action simply because, on the
tactical advice of his attorney, he asserted partial responsibility for
the accident in question?
Judicial estoppel, sometimes called the doctrine against the
assertion of inconsistent positions, 1 prevents a litigant from
attempting to assert a position inconsistent with one that he has
asserted in a previous judicial proceeding.2 The doctrine has not
been uniformly adopted by either state or federal courts,3 and the
t S.B. 1988, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. Candidate 1992,
University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professor Stephen B. Burbank;
without his help I would have been hopelessly mired in the history of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. I would also like to thank ChiefJudge William L. Holloway,
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1 See Ellis v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436, 440-41 (10th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 964 (1980); Note,Judicial Estoppel The Refurbishingofajudicial Shiel4
55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 409,410 n.8 (1987) [hereinafter Refurbishingajudicial Shield];
Comment, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine ofjudicial Estoppe4 80 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1244 (1986) [hereinafter Inconsistent Statements].
2 This Comment will not explore the difficult question ofwhether, if the doctrine
should be used at all, it should apply to assertions not made in actual "court cases."
See generally Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (statements
made to workmen's compensation board); B. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAw
PLEADING 435 (3d ed. 1923) (noting the operation of estoppels from different
matters).
3 For federal circuits that have accepted the doctrine, see, e.g., Astor Chauffeured
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United States Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled on the
validity of the doctrine, only mentioning it once in passing.4 The
power granted by the doctrine of judicial estoppel permits both
plaintiffs5 and defendants to prevent the disposition of otherwise
meritorious cases-in other words it is capable of being used as a
sword, rather than as a shield.6
Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1547-48 (7th Cir. 1990);
Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 716 (9th Cir. 1990);
Young v. United States Dep't of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied 110 S. Ct. 1116 (1990); Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660,
665 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968 (1988); American Nat'l Bank v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 1528, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983); Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982); Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166
(4th Cir. 1982). But see New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises,
Inc., No. 89-6082 (S.D.N.Y.June 14, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (finding
the doctrine to conflict with Rule 8(e)(2) and noting that its vitality in the Second
Circuit is in serious doubt); David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F.Supp.
752, 762-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
For federal circuits that have rejected the doctrine, see, e.g., Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1520 n.10 (10th Cir. 1991) ("this
court does not recognize the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel"); Konstantinidis v. Chen,
626 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438
(10th Cir. 1956); cf. Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428, 1432 (10th Cir.
1990) (reaffirming Parkinson).
For state courts adopting the doctrine, see, e.g., Ray v. Midfield Park, Inc., 289
Ala. 137, 142, 266 So.2d 291, 295 (1972); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Marchant Enters.,
Inc., 791 P.2d 354, 356 (Alaska 1990); Rosa v. CWJ Contractors, Ltd., 4 Haw. App.
210, 219, 664 P.2d 745, 751 (1983); Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796
P.2d 276, 286 (Okla. 1990); Hicks v. AndrewJohnson Bank, No. 137 (Tenn. Ct. App.
filed Mar. 16, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn file); Long v. Knox, 155 Tex. 581,
585, 291 S.W.2d 292, 295 (1956); Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 1976).
For states rejecting the doctrine, see, e.g., Brown v. Gerstein, 17 Mass. App. Ct.
558, 568-69 n.19, 460 N.E.2d 1043, 1051 n.19 (1984), review denied, 391 Mass. 1105,
464 N.E.2d 73; MacFarlane v. Manly, 274 S.C. 392, 395, 264 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1980).
4 See Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 606 n.18 (1975). In Huffman the Court
stated that
[w]e in no way intend to suggest that there is a right of access to a federal
forum for the disposition of all federal issues, or that the normal rules of
res judicata and judicial estoppel do not operate to bar relitigation in
actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of federal issues arising in state court
proceedings.
Id. However, due to the facts of that case, it is likely that the Court was not referring
to judicial estoppel, since it involved the relitigation of previously decided issues
between the same parties. See id. at 595-99. Thus, the Court has never actually
considered the use ofjudicial estoppel in federal courts.
5 See infra note 15 regarding offensive use ofjudicial estoppel.
6 The title of this Comment is derived from a remark made by the Supreme Court
in Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), in which the Court said of the holding in
Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), that it had enabled the Civil War Amendments
to "serve as a sword, rather than merely as a shield, for those whom they were
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Even those jurisdictions that accept the doctrine cannot agree
on its purpose or requirements. 7 The first use of the doctrine, in
Tennessee in 1857, held that the assertion of any position in a
judicial proceeding could work an estoppel on a later attempt to
contradict that position in the same or a different proceeding,
unless the first assertion was caused by a mistake, inadvertence, or
fraud.8 The Tennessee Supreme Court justified this "absolute
rule"9 with its desire to protect the sanctity of the oath, and to
safeguard the judicial system from being abused and having its
image tainted.10 Other courts have said that the purpose of the
doctrine is "[t]o avoid repetitious litigation and to protectjustifiable
reliance on opposing parties' positions in litigation."11 Tennessee
requires only that the previous assertion have been made under
oath 2 and that the new assertion be inconsistent with it.13
Other jurisdictions tone down that rule somewhat by requiring that
the parties be in privity or that the party contesting the estoppel
have enjoyed a "prior success" with the first assertion.
14
Whatever the justifications and requirements of the doctrine
may be, its application is fraught with the potential for causing
litigants great hardship. The doctrine may also impede the truth-
designed to protect." See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664.
See Young v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 882 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1989)
("The circumstances under which the doctrine could be applied are far from dear."),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1116 (1990); cf. Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 936 n.6
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (rejecting the doctrine, but noting that "[t]he definitions of...
'judicial estoppel' vary considerably throughout the literature of this confused area
of the law"). See infra notes 38-84 and accompanying text.
8 See Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 87 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39, 47-48 (1857).
9 See Inconsistent Sta ts, supra note 1, at 1246.
1 See Hamilton, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) at 48. See also Young, 882 F.2d at 639
(describing the purpose of the doctrine as protecting judicial integrity and avoiding
"unseemliness"); Scarano v. Central R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953)
(describing the maintenance of inconsistent positions as "playing'fast and loose with
the courts,'" which was an "affront to judicial dignity").
1 Ellis v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436,440 (10th Cir. 1979) (applying the
Oklahoma version of the doctrine in a diversity case), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 964 (1980).
Oklahoma's justifications forjudicial estoppel are strikingly similar to those advanced
for equitable estoppel in otherjurisdictions. This similarity is not surprising in light
of the fact that under Oklahoma law the two doctrines appear to have almost
identical requirements. See id.; infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
12 See Hamilton, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) at 48. That requirement may have fallen by
the wayside recently. See Hicks v. Andrew Johnson Bank, No. 137 (Tenn. Ct. App.
filed Mar. 16, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn file).
13 See Hamilton, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) at 48.
14 See generally Inconsistent Statements, supra note 1, at 1249-50 (detailing various
formulations of the doctrine).
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seeking purpose of the judicial system, as its use will more often
than not result in a litigant's entire case being thrown out.
15
Moreover, there are certain cases in which a litigant cannot help but
assert inconsistent positions in separate judicial actions, and judicial
estoppel, at least in its absolute form, 16 would appear to apply to
these cases to prevent a court from uncovering the truth of a
matter.
17
1s See id. at 1244 n. 2; Finley v. Kesling, 105 111. App. 3d 1, 433 N.E.2d 1112
(1982). In Finley, the plaintiffhad asserted in an Indiana divorce suit that his children
owned 40% of the stock of the Oakland A's baseball team. The court accepted that
assertion in dividing up the marital property. Eight years later, when the plaintiff
instituted this suit for a declaratoryjudgment that he was the beneficial owner of that
stock, the Illinois court held that he was judicially estopped from maintaining such
a claim. See 105 Ill. App. 3d at 2-6, 433 N.E.2d at 1114-16. That holding only
precluded the position that Finley was the beneficial owner of the stock in question,
yet its result was the dismissal of his suit in its entirety. See id. at 10, 433 N.E.2d at
1119. It is interesting to note that the assertions in this case may not in fact have
been "inconsistent," if Illinois distinguishes between actual ownership and beneficial
ownership. The court did not discuss this point, but simply assumed that the
plaintiff's claim was that the stock was "in effect, his property." See id.; infra notes
199-204 and accompanying text (regarding flawed analyses of consistency). A far
more interesting point about Finley is that the case was in fact decided under Illinois'
doctrine of collateral estoppel. The court used judicial estoppel only to add force to
its holding that Finley was collaterally estopped from "challenging" the Indiana
divorce decree in its courts. See 105 InI. App. 3d at 10, 433 N.E.2d at 1119. As a
result of its factual posture, Finley presents several problems regarding choice of law.
Not only is there the choice of which state's estoppel formulations to apply, there is
also the choice of which state's common law or statutes regarding (beneficial)
ownership should apply. In a case of this nature, which state's law should a court use
to decide if the assertions are actually inconsistent?
In large part, this Comment presumes that a defendant is seeking to preclude a
plaintiff from asserting a position contrary to one previously taken. However, it is
also possible forjudicial estoppel, like collateral estoppel, to be used "offensively" by
a plaintiff against a defendant. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-
33 (1979). Indeed, it is difficult to see why the estoppel permitted in Parklane Hosiey
could notjust as easily be labeled 'judicial." The only difference is that the defendant
in that case was not successful in maintaining its prior position. However, as the
hypothetical in the opening paragraph of this Comment reveals, satisfying this prior
success requirement is conceivable.
. Tennessee, always at the vanguard with respect to judicial estoppel, appears to
have permitted offensive use of the doctrine this past year, in Moore v. Mundy, No.
01-A-01-9002-CH-00071 (Tenn. Ct. App., Aug. 1, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn
file). In that case, the defendant was firstjudicially estopped from asserting a defense
inconsistent with a position that he had maintained successfully in a prior suit against
a different party. See id., slip op. at 3 The court then used the prior position to find
the defendant liable to the plaintiffs and enter judgment for them. See id., slip op.
at 7-8.
16 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
17 For example,jurisdictional peculiarities may require that different aspects of
a plaintiff's asserted rights be adjudicated in different fora, and hence in separate
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In its most basic form, judicial estoppel operates to prevent a
litigant from attempting to contradict a position which he has
asserted' 8 in a prior judicial proceeding, whether or not the prior
proceeding was against the party seeking to use the estoppel.19
Some jurisdictions, however, have demanded that the party seeking
to use the estoppel have been a party to the prior action.20 Other
jurisdictions have required that the party seeking the benefit of the
doctrine demonstrate that it justifiably relied on the prior asser-
tion.
21
actions. This raises the possibility that a plaintiff might have to elect which rights to
pursue even when election of remedies would not have been required had all claims
been presented in a single proceeding. Cf GuyJames Constr. Co. v. Trinity Indus.,
644 F.2d 525, 529-30 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing application of Texas law of election
of remedies).
In In reJohnson, 518 F.2d 246, 253 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975),
the court noted that one of the claims could not have been brought in the earlier
proceeding. In Kalikow 78/79 Co. v. State, No. 41299-89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 2,
1990), the plaintiff had previously brought a proceeding under New York's Article 78
to have the real estate taxes lowered on several properties. The plaintiff then sued
the state of New York for a declaratory judgment that, among other things, its real
estate tax assessment system was unconstitutional. The court found that he was
judicially estopped to claim first that his taxes were too high and then ask for relief
that would, in effect, raise everyone's taxes. See id., slip op. at 10, 15. The plaintiff
would, however, have been able to make both assertions in one proceeding, except
that actions for declaratoryjudgments may not be brought in Article 78 proceedings
and vice-versa. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 3014 (Consol. 1989); Ammex Warehouse
Co. v. Procaccino, 85 Misc. 2d 327, 329, 378 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.), aff'd,
55 A.D.2d 535, 389 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1976). Judicial estoppel is thus capable not only
of preventing a court from finding the truth, but also of forcing a litigant to choose
amongst otherwise valid rights to assert.
18 Most jurisdictions require that the party to be estopped have enjoyed some
success in the maintenance of that prior assertion. See cases cited in appendix, infra
notes 286-332. But see Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39, 48 (1857)
(requiring only that the prior assertion have been under oath).
19 See e.g., Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982)
("WJudicial estoppel may be applied even if ... privity does not exist.");
Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same).
20 See, e.g., Ellis v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436, 440 (10th Cir. 1979)
("[T]he parties... must be the same."), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 964 (1980) ;Johnson, 518
F.2d at 252 (same); Scarano v. Central R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953) ("A
plaintiff who has obtained relief from an adversary [with] one position may not be
heard.., to contradict himself.., to establish against the same adversary a second
claim inconsistent with [the first].").
21 See, e.g., Young v. United States Dep't of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir.
1989) ("The keyingredient, however, is reliance."), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1116 (1990);
Ellis, 609 F.2d at 440 ("[T]he party claiming estoppel must have ... changed his
position.").
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This Comment will argue that the doctrine of judicial estoppel,
as it has been defined and applied since 1857,22 yields harsh and
unjust results. In addition, it violates the principles behind the now
almost universally accepted practice of permitting inconsistent and
alternative pleading.23 Consequently, this Comment will argue
that the doctrine should be abandoned in jurisdictions whose rules
of civil procedure, including their discovery rules, are similar to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
24
Part I of this Comment will examine the forms of judicial
estoppel that have been applied (and rejected) in the federal circuits
and in representative state courts, along with other forms of
estoppel that are commonly used, and will also look at the purposes
behind such doctrines, their benefits, and their drawbacks. Part II
will examine the purposes and policies behind procedural systems
which permit inconsistent and alternative pleading, and will
specifically look into the rationales for the adoption of Rule 8(e)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part III will argue that the
doctrine ofjudicial estoppel conflicts with the goals behind systems
that permit or encourage inconsistent and alternative pleading, and
will examine other objections to the doctrine. Finally, Part IV will
examine the Tenth Circuit's recent affirmations of its anti-judicial
estoppel stance,25 and will propose a model for the use of prior
22 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
23 See, e.g., FED. R. CIrv. P. 8(e)(2) (permitting inconsistent, alternative and
hypothetical pleading); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 3014 (Consol. 1989) (same); Parkinson
v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438 (10th Cir. 1956) (holding thatjudicial estoppel
conflicts with the spirit of Rule 8(e)(2)); cf. Giannone v. United States Steel Corp., 238
F.2d 544,547-48 (3d Cir. 1956) (noting the court's perception that it would defeat the
policy behind Rule 8(e)(2) by permitting prior inconsistent pleadings to be admissible
as evidence against their maker in a later case). See generally C. CLARK, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING, 254-58 (2d ed. 1947) (noting that by that time, at
least 20 states and the federal courts had adopted systems that permitted alternative
and inconsistent pleading).
24 It is beyond the scope of this Comment to attempt to canvass, on a state-by-
state basis, the pleading systems now in effect in the United States. For that reason,
this Comment will confine itself to an examination ofjudicial estoppel in the federal
courts and in selected state courts, where that examination is illustrative. The author
leaves for another day the task of categorizing the state pleading systems and deciding
which ones fit the analytical framework of this Comment, and does not mean to imply
that this Comment constitutes an exhaustive study.
25 See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1520 n.10
(10th Cir. 1991); Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428, 1432 (10th Cir.
1990); United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1986). But
see Refurbishing ajudicial Shield supra note 1, at 426 (claiming that the Tenth Circuit
had been retreating from its hostility tojudicial estoppel and was attempting to limit
Parkinson to its facts).
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
inconsistent positions to create a "bursting bubble" presumption
26
as to the truth of prior assertions. This presumption, along with the
appropriate use of sanctions against both attorneys and litigants,
27
would accomplish all that judicial estoppel arguably does and more,
with few, if any, of the harsh results.
I. DEFINITIONS AND USES OF DOCTRINES OF ESTOPPEL
The purpose of this section is to examine the various formula-
tions of judicial estoppel that have been accepted over the years,
both in state and federal courts, as well as the claimed purposes and
benefits of each of the formulations. It will then attempt to distill
from these formulations a "core" set of requirements and justifica-
tions which can be analyzed within the framework of alternative and
inconsistent pleading systems. By way of introduction, it begins
with a short description of more traditional forms of estoppel-res
judicata, equitable estoppel, and collateral estoppel-so that the
reader can have in mind the different forms of preclusion available
to courts as judicial estoppel is discussed in detail.
A. Other Forms of Estoppel
Equitable estoppel is a doctrine designed to do justice between
the parties, as opposed to maintaining the integrity of the judicial
system or the sanctity of the oath.28 The doctrine is applicable
only when the party who seeks to assert it was an adverse party to
the prior proceeding (the privity requirement), has acted in reliance
upon the previously asserted position, and can demonstrate that his
interests would be prejudiced if the court perrhitted the opposing
party to change positions.
29
26 See e.g., Tenneco Chem., Inc. v. William T. Burnett & Co., 691 F.2d 658, 663-64
(4th Cir. 1982) (discussing the operation of presumptions under the Federal Rules of
Evidence).
2 See e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 4595 (U.S. June 6, 1991)
(discussing the federal courts' inherent sanction powers); Business Guides, Inc. v.
Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922, 933 (1991) (applying the
same standard to represented parties and attorneys under Rule 11); FED. R. Civ. P.
11 (providing sanctions for an attorney, a party, or both).
21 See Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980); ef. Scarano v.
Central R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953) (classifying intentional self
contradiction as "a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided for
suitors seeking justice").
29 See Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at 937.
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Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, serves several functions.
It protects litigants from having to relitigate identical issues, either
with the first adverse party or his privies, or against anyone else.
3 0
It also "promot[es] judicial economy by preventing needless
litigation."3 1 The doctrine has two requirements. First, the issue
to be precluded must actually have been litigated and decided by
the previous court. A litigant can meet this requirement by
demonstrating that the issue was merely put into evidence by one
party, as long as a determination of the issue was made.3 2 Second,
the issue must have been necessary to the outcome of the first
action.3 3 The Supreme Court now permits the use of "offensive
collateral estoppel," by means of which a plaintiff seeks "to estop a
defendant from relitigating the issues which the defendant previous-
ly litigated and lost against another plaintiff."
3 4
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, on the other hand, is an
estoppel doctrine that applies only between parties to the original
action and their privies.3 5  In order to encourage "reliance on
judicial decisions," prevent vexatious or harassing litigation, and
enable the courts to consider other, implicitly more meritorious
disputes, the doctrine prohibits relitigation of "all grounds for, or
defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties,
regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior
proceeding."3 6 The doctrine only applies once the court has
rendered a final judgment on the merits of the proceeding,3
7
thereby discouraging piecemeal litigation.
30 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (noting that one
purpose of collateral estoppel is to "protect[] litigants from the burden of relitigating
an identical issue with the same party or his privy"); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971) (abandoning the
requirement of mutuality in patent cases, in order not to force defendants "to present
a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the plaintiff has fully litigated and
lost in a prior action").
31 Parklane Hosiy, 439 U.S. at 326.
52 See Continental Can Co., U.S.A. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 1979).
This would appear to permit collateral estoppel, in effect, to be accorded to an issue
which was merely pleaded by one side and not opposed at trial by the other party.
See Refurbishing a Judicial Shield supra note 1, at 415 n.35 (same). But see Allen v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982) (implying that the court might
not utilize collateral estoppel if the issue had not been contested at trial).
33 See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326 n.5.
34 Id. at 329.
35 See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979); Parklane Hosiety, 439 U.S. at 326
n.5 (1979).
1 Brown, 442 U.S. at 131 (1979).
37 See id.
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B. Judicial Estoppel
The 1857 Tennessee Supreme Court case in which the doctrine
of judicial estoppel made its first appearance was Hamilton v.
Zimmerman.38  Hamilton alleged that he was the defendant's
partner in a drug store, but the defendant claimed that Hamilton
was only a store clerk.s9 The defendant then discovered plead-
ings40 from an earlier court action in which Hamilton stated that
a number of allegations in a pleading that described Hamilton as a
store clerk were "substantially true."41 The Tennessee Supreme
Court held that Hamilton's answer was an implicit admission under
oath that he was a clerk in the employ of the defendant, and that
such an assertion judicially estopped him from asserting, in the
second case, that he and the defendant were partners.42 Later
Tennessee courts explicitly stated that the prior assertions of a
litigant fully precluded him from attempting to contradict the
matters contained therein, and thus were conclusive evidence of
those matters in a later proceeding.43 Thus, in its original formu-
lation, a litigant seeking to judicially estop his opponent from
asserting a position need only have shown that his opponent had
asserted an inconsistent position under oath in a prior judicial
proceeding.
Other states have accepted the doctrine, but have imposed more
restrictions on its use.4 4 Texas, for example, requires both prior
success-the party against whom estoppel is sought must have
"successfully maintained" the prior position, and prejudice-permit-
ting the reversal must prejudice the current adversary other than in
the way that any assertion by one party is necessarily prejudicial to
her opposition.45 Oklahoma's version of the doctrine shares these
38 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39 (1857). See also Inconsistent Statements, supra note 1, at
1252 n.73 (describing the doctrine's birth in the Tennessee courts).
39 See 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) at 41.
40 Pleadings apparently were called "bills" during that period. See Inconsistent
Statements, supra note 1, at 1252 n.73.
41 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) at 47.
42 See id. As in Finley v. Kesling, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1,433 N.E. 2d 1112 (1982), this
ruling probably resulted in the dismissal of the plaintiff's case. See supra note 15.
43 See, e.g., Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn. 633, 653, 266 S.W. 313,
318 (1924) (holding that a prior assertion is "not merely evidence against the litigant,
but [rather estops] him from denying its truth").
44 See Inconsistent Statements, supra note 1, at 1251 (stating that only Tennessee
courts follow the absolute rule ofjudicial estoppel).
4' Herd Corp. v. Triple "J" Inv., Inc., No. B14-86-506-CV, slip op. at 8 n.2. (Tex.
App. 14th Dist. Sept. 24, 1987). But seeJohnson Serv. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
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requirements, and the Tenth Circuit has claimed that Oklahoma
also requires that the party seeking to assert the estoppel must have
been a party to the prior proceeding.
46
In describing its version of the doctrine, the Alabama Supreme
Court cited with approval two of its earlier cases that applied
judicial estoppel within the same proceeding.47 The first case
involved a defendant's attempt to deny a sworn affidavit securing
circuit court jurisdiction, while the second involved an attempt to
defeat jurisdiction in the same manner. 48 Wyoming appears to
require only prior success in order to warrant application of the
doctrine.49 Tennessee, hewing to its absolute position, still does
not require any form of prior success.
50
Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Louisiana have rejected
judicial estoppel outright. In Brown v. Gerstein,5 1 the Court of
Appeals of Massachusetts stated that the courts of Massachusetts
had never adopted the doctrine and showed no signs of doing
485 F.2d 164, 174 (5th Cir. 1973) (claiming to apply the Texas law of judicial
estoppel, but not requiring prior success or prejudice).
4 See Ellis v. Arkansas La. Gas 'Co., 609 F.2d 436,440 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 964 (1980). Ellis also held that the party claiming the estoppel "must have
been misled and have changed his position" as a result of the assertion by the
opposing party of its prior position. Id. But see In reJohnson, 518 F.2d 246, 252
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975) (requiring only prejudice and prior
success). Johnson is also noteworthy because it appears to hold that Oklahoma's
version ofjudicial estoppel may be applied to inconsistent positions within a single
proceeding. See id. This appears to run directly counter to Oklahoma's pleading
rules, which parallel the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See OKLA STAT. tit. 12,
§ 2008(E)(2) (Supp. 1991). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized this
problem, and the larger problem of whether or not its revised rules of pleading
permit the continued use of judicial estoppel, but has not yet been faced with a
proper case in which to make that decision. See Panama Processes v. Cities Serv. Co.,
796 P.2d 276, 287 n.43 (Okla. 1990).
47 See Rayv. Midfield Park, Inc., 289 Ala. 137, 142, 266 So.2d 291, 295-96 (1972).
48 See id. at 142, 266 So.2d at 295-96 (citing Brown v. French, 159 Ala. 645, 49 So.
255 (1909) and Maner v. Maner, 279 Ala. 652, 189 So.2d 336 (1966)). Judicial
estoppel has also been applied to a position assumed by a litigant in a memorandum
of law in order to secure a court's favorable disposition of a case. See Patriot
Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 213 (1st Cir. 1987).
49 See Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 1976). It is unclear whether or
not privity is required under Wyoming law, since Allen involved a post-divorce
declaratory judgment action between a husband and a wife (together with her son),
and the Wyoming Supreme Court did not state explicitly that it was resting any part
of its holding on the existence of privity. See id.
5o See Hicks v. AndrewJohnson Bank, No. 137 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Mar. 16,
1990) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn file).
51 17 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 460 N.E.2d 1043 (1984).
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so.5 2 The court implied that it was doubtful that the doctrine
could have any vitality in Massachusetts because of its rules of
evidence and pleading. It cited the Massachusetts statute that
permits allegations of fact filed in pleadings, even those from prior
proceedings, to be considered admissions on the part of the party
who made them. Such admissions, however, are open to explana-
tion and contradiction.13  In MacFarlane v. Manly,54 the South
Carolina Supreme Court made the extraordinarily sweeping
statement that litigants in South Carolina had always been able to
plead inconsistently between different proceedings, and that the
mere fact of an inconsistency was not enough to bar their rights of
recovery.55 Interestingly, South Carolina's pleading rules parallel
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 6 Louisiana's Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed its anti-judicial estoppel stance in Doyle v.
State Farm (Mutual) Insurance Co.57
Federal circuits that have applied judicial estoppel have done so
in different ways depending upon whether the case arose under
federal question jurisdiction 58 or diversity jurisdiction.59 The
Tenth Circuit refuses to apply the doctrine in federal question
cases, but permits the application of state judicial estoppel formula-
tions in diversity cases.60 The Federal Circuit is unusual because
it has held, in at least one case, that when judicial estoppel arises in
a case involving "patent counts," it will apply the judicial estoppel
law of "the regional circuit.., where the appeal would lie but for
the patent counts." 61 The Ninth Circuit has accepted the doctrine
52 See id. at 568-69 n.19, 460 N.E.2d at 1051 n.19.
53 See id.; MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 87 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
54 274 S.C. 392, 264 S.E.2d 838 (1980).
55 See id. at 395, 264 S.E.2d at 840.
56See S.C.R. Civ. P. 8, 18 (1985).
57 415 So.2d 216 (1982).
58See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
59 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988). Those circuits that accept the doctrine cannot
agree whether to apply a federal formulation of judicial estoppel or a state
formulation, because of the difficulty of ascertaining whether this is a substantive or
a procedural doctrine. Compare Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162,1167 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1982) (applying federal law) withJohnson Serv. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 485
F.2d 164, 174-76 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Texas law).
60 Compare Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 437-38 (10th Cir. 1956)
(refusing to recognize the doctrine) with Ellis v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436,
440 (10th Cir. 1979) (applying Oklahoma'sjudicial estoppel doctrine), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 964 (1980) and In re Johnson, 518 F.2d 246, 252 (10th Cir.) (applying
Oklahoma's judicial estoppel formulation), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975).
61 Water Tech. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 665 n.3 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 968 (1988) (citing Digital Equip. Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 805 F.2d 380, 383
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as viable in the abstract sense, but has not decided which version to
apply.
6 2
The First Circuit is anomalous, as it seems to have both accepted
and rejected the doctrine. In Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinemas
Corp.,6 Judge Campbell noted that the doctrine had been accepted
in the First Circuit as long ago as 1911. 64 But in an earlier deci-
sion, Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp.,65 Judge Campbell had
joined in an opinion which declined to apply a doctrine similar to
judicial estoppel because it conflicted with Rule 8(e)(2).66 The
Patriot court never mentioned Keebler, which suggests that the
availability of the doctrine in the circuit may be an open ques-
tion.
67
The federal circuits that have accepted the doctrine and have
fleshed out the requirements for applying it have restricted its use
inconsistently. 68 All require that the party against whom the
estoppel is asserted have enjoyed at least some prior success with its
previous assertion.69 The major difference is whether the circuit
requires that the "prior success" be demonstrated by the party
n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). This raises the bizarre possibility that the Federal Circuit could
be required to apply as many as ten different formulations (including not applying
it at all, because the Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits reject the doctrine) of
judicial estoppel. While this does not fall under the definition of an "outcome
determinative" rule that would require a federal court to apply state law in a diversity
case, see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), it is to be kept in mind in
deciding whether to permitjudicial estoppel at all, considering the lack ofuniformity
in the doctrine's formulations in those jurisdictions that apply it.
62 See e.g., Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 716-17
(9th Cir. 1990) ("This circuit... has yet to state the requirements for the doctrine's
application[,] ... [and i]n this case it is unnecessary to ... ."); Stevens Technical
Serv., Inc. v. SS Brooklyn, 885 F.2d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1989).
63 834 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1987).
64 See id. at 212.
65 624 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1980).
66 See id. at 373-74 n.7.
67 The Patriot decision easily could be limited to its facts, however, due to the
court's feeling that it was holding Patriot to a bargain that it had made with a state
court in the prior action. See Patrio 834 F.2d at 214.
68 See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
69 See, e.g., Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d
1540, 1548 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring successful legal action);JacksonJordan, Inc. v.
Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (requiring, in dicta, some
previous success with claim); Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th
Cir. 1982) (requiring successful and unequivocable assertion); Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co.,
667 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1982) (found prior successful assertion compelling);
City of Kingsport v. Steel and Roof Structure, Inc., 500 F.2d 617, 620 (6th Cir. 1974)
(found that the law requires prior success).
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having won its earlier case on the merits,70 or by convincing the
previous court of the truth of that specific assertion.71 The federal
circuits are similarly split on whether the application of the doctrine
requires that the party asserting estoppel have been a party to the
previous suit or be in privity with such a party.72  Another fre-
quently mentioned requirement is reliance upon the previous
assertion by the opposing party.7s Some of the federal circuits
explicitly require reliance,74 others explicitly do not,75 and others
ignore it.
76
Several circuits have claimed that a court may apply the doctrine
if it appears that a litigant has attempted to take advantage of the
judicial system.77  This requirement has been stated in several
70 The Seventh Circuit stated this requirement when it held that it would apply
"judicial estoppel only if a party prevails in Suit #1 on the basis of a position
inconsistent with that latterly taken." Astor Limousine 910 F.2d at 1548.
71 The Sixth Circuit stated that "[a] party need not finally prevail on the merits in
the first proceeding." Edwards, 690 F.2d at 599 n.5. The Federal Circuit was unclear
on this point when the court said that the allegedly estopped party must have
"received some benefit from the previously asserted position," yet also says that the
party must have "'won' because of it." Jackson Jordan, 747 F.2d at 1579. This
language could refer to either possibility. The Fourth Circuit waffled between the
two possibilities in Allen when it stated that the doctrinal application was "not
necessarily confined to situations where the party asserting the earlier contrary
position there prevailed .... " 667 F.2d at 1167; see also City of Kingspor; 500 F.2d
at 620 (using similar language).
72 Compare Jackson Jordan, 747 F.2d at 1579 (finding no authority for the
application of the doctrine "in favor of a total stranger to the first phase of the
dispute") with Edwards, 690 F.2d at 598 ("judicial estoppel maybe applied even if...
privity does not exist").
7- See the discussions of equitable and collateral estoppel, supra notes 28-34 and
accompanying text.74 See e.g., Young v. United States Dep't of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir.
1989) ("The key ingredient, however, is reliance."), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1116 (1990);
Jackson Jordan, 747 F.2d at 1579 ("there must be 'representation, reliance and
prejudice'") (citing IB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 1 0.405[8] at 239 (1983)); In re
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 859, 861 ("[flederal courts deciding federal
issues... usually confin[ed] [the doctrine] to circumstances in which the opposing
party took action in reliance .... ."), aJd en ban, 542 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd
on other grounds, Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, rehg denied, 431
U.S. 975 (1977).
71 See e.g., Edwards, 690 F.2d at 598 ("judicial estoppel may be applied even if
detrimental reliance ... does not exist"); Tenneco Chem. v. William T. Burnett &
Co., 691 F.2d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Reliance... is not a factor to be considered
in judicial estoppel cases.").76 See Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540,
1548 (7th Cir. 1990).
77 See, e.g., American Nat'l. Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 1528,
1536 (l1th Cir. 1983) ("The doctrine is designed to prevent parties from making a
mockery ofjustice by inconsistent pleadings.").
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forms. The most common is that the litigant must have been
attempting to "play fast and loose" with the courts.78 The Federal
Circuit has gone somewhat farther, saying in dicta that a court may
apply judicial estoppel if "the court itself feels that it has been mis-
used."79 This may be related to the requirements imposed by Rule
11. In Astor Limousine, the Seventh Circuit, having rhetorically
asked why a litigant should be permitted to win two different suits
by disproving an assertion in one and proving it in the other, went
on to say that this "inconsistency probably demonstrates a violation
of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. "80
The last requirement often considered by courts discussing
judicial estoppel is that of prejudice to the party asserting the
estoppel. If a party were permitted to maintain a position inconsis-
tent with his previous assertion, then it would be inequitable to
permit the change in position. When this idea is discussed, the
courts always require some showing of prejudice.8 1 Some courts,
however, never discuss prejudice, and thus do not explicitly require
it.8 2 Finally, in Tenneco Chemicals the Fourth Circuit was asked to
apply judicial estoppel to Tenneco's previous misstatements
regarding the procedural law applicable to the case. 83 That court
held thatjudicial estoppel could not be applied to statements of the
law, since opposing parties are never relieved of the requirement of
knowing the law that controls their cases.84
This Comment will use the most widely accepted model of
judicial estoppel,8 5 which requires prior judicial success, 86 to
78 See e.g., Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st
Cir. 1987) (using phrase); Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th
Cir. 1984) (quoting Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953)), cer.
denied, 469 U.S. 1197 (1985); Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir.
1982) (using the phrase); Tenneco Chem., 691 F.2d at 665 (quoting Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1177-78 (1975)).79jackson Jordan, Inc., v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1984). Cf Tenneco Chem., 691 F.2d at 665 ("the determinative factor is whether the
[litigant] intentionally misled the court").
" Astor Limousine, 910 F.2d at 1548.
81 See, e.g., JacksonJordan, 747 F.2d at 1580 ("we see no justification for wholly
dispensing with reliance and prejudice as minimum requirements"); In reJohnson,
518 F.2d 246, 252 (10th Cir.) (judicial estoppel applies when "assuming an
inconsistent position [would prejudice] the adverse party"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893
(1975).
82 See cases cited in appendix, infra notes 286-332.
8 See Tenneco Chem., 691 F.2d at 664.
84 See id. at 664-65.
85 See Inconsistent Statements, supra note 1, at 1270 (urging the adoption by all
federal circuits of this formulation); RefurbishingaJudicial Shield; supra note 1, at 435
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analyze critically the doctrine in light of the rationales invoked by
jurisdictions that permit inconsistent or alternative pleading. This
Comment will also consider other objections to judicial estoppel.
Before examining inconsistent and alternative pleading systems,
it is worthwhile to examine the different reasons that courts have
given for applying judicial estoppel.
The most frequently cited rationale for judicial estoppel is to
prevent litigants from "playing fast and loose" with the judicial
system.87 Mostjurisdictions that recognize judicial estoppel invoke
this reason to justify the doctrine.88 Even those that reject the
doctrine recognize this as a valid purpose.8 9 This rationale has
been asserted to justify Tennessee's absolute formulation ofjudicial
estoppel, which does not require prior success using the previous
assertion. 90 Ironically, one objection to the doctrine is that its
application actually erodes the integrity of the judicial system.
91
(defining judicial estoppel "as a bar against the alteration of a factual assertion that
is inconsistent with a position sworn to and benefitted from in an earlier proceed-
ing").
'6 Seesupra notes 69-71 and accompanying text; appendix, infra notes 286-332 and
accompanying text.87 Saano v. Central R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953) (adopting this
rationale); see also supra note 3 (citing cases adopting this doctrine which cite Scarano).
" See, e.g., Young v. United States Dep't of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1116 (1990); Stevens Technical Serv., Inc. v. SS
Brooklyn, 885 F.2d 584,588 (9th Cir. 1989); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema
Corp., 834 F.2d 208,212 (1st Cir. 1987); Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166
(4th Cir. 1982); Sperling v. United States, 692 F.2d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 1982) (Van
Graafeiland,J. concurring) (applyingjudicial estoppel to criminal appeals in federal
habeas corpus proceedings), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983); Rosa v. CWJ
Contractors, Ltd., 4 Hawaii App. 210, 219, 664 P.2d 745, 751 (1983); Allen v. Allen,
550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 1976).
89 See e.g., Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (rejecting
judicial estoppel because it has never been adopted by a District of Columbia court,
but noting thatjudicial estoppel "maybe invoked to prevent a party from playing 'fast
and loose with the courts'" (quoting Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513)).
90 See Stevens Technical Serv., 885 F.2d at 589; see also Inconsistent Statements, supra
note 1, at 1251 (noting that "[firom this policy flows the absolute rule").
91 In Farley v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 133 La. 497, 63 So. 122 (1913), the
Louisiana Supreme Court cast serious doubt on the validity of the entire doctrine of
judicial estoppel, stating:
The justice or propriety of penalizing the offender, beyond the logical effect
of his conduct in the case itself, and his punishment, so far as the acts are
criminal, upon direct proceedings, appears to be open to grave doubt. That
a court of justice should 'strike back' at one attempting fraud upon the
purity of its proceedings by depriving him of a fair consideration of the real
merits of his case does not seem consistent with its dignity. The sounder
rule ofjudicial administration seems to be to the effect that the situation as
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The oldest justification for the doctrine was expounded by the
Tennessee Supreme Court in 1857: the necessity to protect the
sanctity of the oath.92 Many jurisdictions that currently recognize
the doctrine hold this to be one of the reasons for so doing,93 and
even those jurisdictions that reject judicial estoppel recognize the
need to have this type of protection. 94 Protecting the sanctity of
the oath naturally leads to another purpose of the doctrine:
protecting the integrity of the judicial system and process. One
commentator has stated that these two purposes are actually the
same.95 A majority of the jurisdictions, both state96 and feder-
al,97 that apply judicial estoppel do so on this basis.
Several federal circuits have reasoned that judicial estoppel is
necessary to prevent unscrupulous litigants from obtaining an unfair
advantage over their adversaries by engaging in intentional self-
contradiction.98  However, this rationale appears to require
developed should not be extended beyond its logical bearings and that a
litigant ought not to be deprived of his legal rights by refusing to receive
other and relevant evidence in his favor, unless, indeed, the jury would not,
as a matter of reason, be justified, after the disclosures, in acting favorably
upon it.
Id. at 544-45, 63 So. at 138 (citation omitted); see also Tenneco Chem. v. William T.
Burnett & Co., 691 F.2d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 1982) (directly conflicting with the
rationale thatjudicial estoppel protects the "integrity" of thejudicial process); Bertha
Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 248 F.2d 833, 837 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hand, J.
dissenting) (stating that "Iljudgment by estoppel is not designed as a moral sanction
against inconsistency"), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958).
92 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Stevens Technical Sev., 885 F.2d at 588 (stating that "the doctrine
upholds the 'public policy which exalts the sanctity of the oath'" (quoting
Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at 937 (quoting Melton v. Anderson, 32 Tenn. App. 335,339,
222 S.W.2d 666, 669 (1948)))); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Marchant Enters., Inc., 791 P.2d
354, 356 (Alaska 1990) (same).
94 See Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at 937 (upholds the sanctity of the oath).
95 See Inconsistent Statements, supra note 1, at 1251.
96 See, e.g., Smith ex rel. Smith, 791 P.2d at 356 (noting that the doctrine ("protect[s]
the integrity of the judicial process")); Rosa v. CWJ Contractors, Ltd., 4 Haw. App.
210,219, 664 P.2d 745, 751 (1983) (same); Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo.
1976) (noting that the doctrine prevents a litigant from "play[ing] hanky-panky with
the courts of this state and thus interfer[ing] with the integrity of the judicial
system"); see also appendix, infra notes 286-332 and accompanying text (table listing
state cases accepting or rejecting judicial estoppel).9 7 See e.g., Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d
1540, 1547 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that "[s]ometimes courts justify the doctrine on
the ground that it is an offense against the judicial system to take inconsistent
positions"). See generally Inconsistent Statements, supra note 1, at 1245 n.8 (collecting
cases).
98 See, e.g., Scarano v. Central R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953) (decrying
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reliance by the opposing party in order to apply the estoppel;
without reliance, it is difficult to see how the threatened reversal of
position could result in an unfair advantage being gained. The
language used by these courts suggests that their concerns are the
fraud and bad-faith pleading tactics contemplated by Rule 11,
suggesting further that such misconduct would be handled more
appropriately through the broad sanction powers available to federal
judges.9 At least one court has also stated that judicial estoppel
should be applied to further principles of "manifest justice.
"1°°
Occasionally, courts reason thatjudicial estoppel, like its cousins
collateral estoppel and res judicata, should be used in order to
further the "'general consideration[s] of the orderly administration
of justice'" 101 or, as the Supreme Court of Hawaii put it, "consid-
erations of the orderliness, regularity, and expedition of litiga-
tion." 10 2 The orderly administration of justice, however, is not at
all threatened by the assertion of inconsistent positions, but rather
is threatened by the possibility of having inconsistent results. Thus
those courts that justify judicial estoppel on efficiency grounds
actually may desire to have the doctrine subsumed within collateral
estoppel or res judicata.
103
Another court has used judicial estoppel to enforce "bargains"
that a litigant had made with another court.104 The plaintiffs in
the use of "intentional self-contradiction... as a means of obtaining unfair advantage
in a forum provided for suitors seekingjustice"); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General
Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987) (same); Arizona v. Shamrock Foods
Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1197 (1985);
Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1982) (explaining thatjudicial
estoppel's "function and justification is to prevent the use of 'intentional self
contradiction... as a means of obtaining unfair advantage'" (quoting Scarano, 203
F.2d at 513)).
99 See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 4595 (U.S.June 6, 1991); infra notes
261-81 and accompanying text.
100 Rosa v. CWJ Contractors, Ltd., 4 Haw. App. 210, 218-19, 664 P.2d 745, 751
(1983) (lending support to those courts that have shown a willingness to raise the
issue ofjudicially estopping a partysuaspont, giving them the ability to claim that the
doctrine was a tool to be used to serve justice). Cf. Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137,
1142 (Wyo. 1976) (discussing the general supervisory authority of that court and its
"liberty to decide a case upon any point which in our opinion the ends of justice
require").
101 Shamrock 729 F.2d at 1215 (citing 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTICE 1 0.405[8],
at 767).
102 Trask v. Tam See, 42 Haw. 324, 333 (1958) (cited in Rosa v. CWJ Contractors,
Ltd., 4 Haw. App. 210, 219, 664 P.2d 745, 751 (Hawaii App. 1983)).10
3 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
104 See Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 213-14 (1st
Cir. 1987).
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Patriot Cinemas had represented, in a memorandum of law to a
Massachusetts Superior Court, that in exchange for that court not
staying the Superior Court case, pending the outcome of its appeal
in the First Circuit, it would not pursue an antitrust claim against
the same defendants in the state court. The plaintiff then sought to
assert the antitrust claim after the Superior Court denied the
stay.105 In that case, the First Circuit noted that:
Patriot can be said to have made a bargain with the superior court.
It traded its chance for success on the antitrust claim for an
increased pace in the proceedings on the remaining three
counts.... Now, however, Patriot wants to have it the other way:
it wants to revive its antitrust claim and have it remanded to the
state court while enjoying the benefit of the increased pace of its
current state action-a benefit obtained by telling the superior
court that it would not proceed with its antitrust claim. This is the
sort of self-serving self-contradiction, or "playing fast and loose
with the courts," that is barred by the doctrine of judicial estop-
pel.
10
6
The First Circuit recognized that this was not "classic" judicial
estoppel, but reasoned that the district courts had been extending
the doctrine to cover cases of this nature and that this presented a
better case for estoppel than mere factual reversals. 10 7 However,
it would appear that both the First and Second Circuits have
mistaken equitable estoppel for judicial estoppel,10 8 for this case
demonstrated privity, reliance, and prejudice, and thus presented a
classic case for equitable rather than judicial estoppel on the basis
of a promise made to a court.
1°9
Finally, there is a disagreement among some of the federal
circuits regarding the nature of the true evil to be prevented by
judicial estoppel. According to the Seventh Circuit, the problem
lies in permitting a litigant to win in one action by saying "X is true"
and then win in a second action by saying "X is false." 110 That is,
the Seventh Circuit fears that without judicial estoppel, different
105 See id. at 211.
1
06 Id. at 213.
107 See id. at 214.
108 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing equitable estoppel).
109 Cf. Young v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 882 F.2d 633, at 639-40 (2nd Cir.
1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1116 (1990) (describing the situation in which a party
obtains relief with an "implicit but misleading representation to a court").
110 See Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540,
1548 (7th Cir. 1990).
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
courts could rule inconsistently on the same issue. The Sixth
Circuit, on the other hand, objects to the mere assertion of
opposing statements in separate actions.m In Jackson Jordan, Inc.
v. Plasser American Corp.,112 the Federal Circuit, trying to resolve
this dilemma, claimed that the doctrine allowed a judge to decide
whether to permit estoppel by focusing on the inconsistency, rather
than the outcome of a particular case.113 This simply begs the
question, however, by permitting the judge to do what the judge
feels is right, and legitimizing that discretion by baptizing it "judicial
estoppel."
Not all federal judges appear to be bothered by the possibility
of inconsistent outcomes in separate trials. ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
dissenting in Parklane Hosiery v. Shore,114 contended that when the
first action was not before a jury and the second action would be,
it would be unfair to prevent the jury from deciding the case.
1 15
He accepted the fact that, without estoppel, the jury might reach a
different result, because he believed that the doctrine interfered
with the right to civil jury trials guaranteed by the seventh amend-
ment.116 While Parklane was not a case about judicial estoppel,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concerns apply just as well to the use of
any form of estoppel when the first action was not before ajury but
the second action could be.
II. ALTERNATIVE AND INCONSISTENT PLEADING SYSTEMS
In order to discuss the reasons for rejecting the doctrine of
judicial estoppel, this Comment will examine the purposes of having
a system that permits or encourages inconsistent and alternative
pleading, by looking into the spirit of Rule 8(e)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
1 1 7
11' See Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982).
112 747 F.2d 1567.
11
3 See id. at 1578-79 (citing WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, § 4477, at 779 (1981)).
114 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
115 See id. at 353 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
116 See id. at 353-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117 -A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has
regardless ofconsistency and whether based on legal, equitable, or maritime grounds.
All statements shall he made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 1 1." FED. R.
CIV. P. 8(e)(2). See also Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438 (10th Cir.
1956) (discussing the spirit of Rule 8(e)(2)).
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A. Getting to the Truth
One reason to move to, a pleading system with simpler and less
regimented pleading rules was to avoid the numerous traps and
pitfalls that accompanied the "meticulous particularity" required by
the "common-law special plea[s]. "1 18 Beyond the desire to elimi-
nate technicalities, the encouragement of alternative, hypothetical,
and inconsistent pleading evinces a broader desire to "get to the
merits" of a case, rather than permit cases to be disposed of on
purely procedural missteps.1 19
This leads to what is perhaps the most important reason to have
alternative, hypothetical, and inconsistent pleadings-to get to the
truth. 120 In this context, one author who was involved directly
with the drafting of Michigan's revised rules of pleading stated that
they were designed with the following maxim in mind:
The effort must be to choose that approach which is most likely
... to develop as fully as possible.., a complete knowledge of all
the events which created the conflict resulting in the litigation, and
to assist in the evaluation of such events and in the awarding of
such consequences as accord with the maximum feasible concep-
tions ofjustice.
12 1
Drafters of pleading rules are not alone in these feelings. The
Supreme Court has stated that it prefers the fullest possible inquiry
into the facts and evidence in a case, 122 noting that estoppel in
general can "blockade[] unexplored paths that may lead to
truth." 123 On other occasions, the Court has stated that discover-
ing the truth was the "sine qua non of a fair trial," 124 and that our
system of justice values the search for truth in judicial proceed-
ings. 125 Truthseeking has been cited as a direct reason for the
118 Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States: Hearings with
Regard to the "Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, "Adopted
by the Supreme Court of the United States Pursuant to the Act ofJune 19, 1934 (48 Stat.
1064) and on H.R. 8892 Before the House Committee on the Judiciay, 75th Cong., 2d
Sess. 98 (1938) (statement of Edgar Tolman) [hereinafter House Hearings].
119 See id. at 24 (statement of William Mitchell).
120 Cf United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 908 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane)
(noting that "[t]ruth is the essential objective of our adversary system ofjustice"), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979)).
121 McDonald, Alternative Pleading: I, 48 MicH. L. REV. 311, 312 (1950).
122 Se, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979) (refusing to accord
collateral estoppel effect when to do so would prevent the "fullest possible inquiry"
to be made by a court).
123 Id. at 132.
124 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
125 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,445 (1984). It could be argued, for example,
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adoption of rules of pleading akin to Rule 8(e)(2), which explicitly
permits inconsistent pleading, at least within the confines of a single
legal action.126 Gradually, both courts and the drafters of rules
on pleading came to realize that it was virtually impossible to
require a litigant to know, with absolute certainty, what the facts
were at the commencement of an action. 127  It makes sense to
permit her to plead everything she can within the bounds of good
faith and Rule 11, give notice to her opponent, and then leave the
determination of the facts to discovery, 128 pre-trial hearings,
129
and trial.1 30 Dean Clark"'1 noted that permitting a plaintiff to
shift position was by far the best rule to have, especially in light of
the modern trend toward liberal pleading rules, which he character-
ized as "sacrific[ing] consistency" in order to work "substantial
justice."1 2 Indeed, Clark argued that, at least with respect to
inconsistent defenses, the rules should only proscribe pleadings that
would require a party to "commit perjury in order to testify."183
Clark relied on the general right of a party to "present his version
of the case to the court or jury," a right not limited to a defen-
dant.1
8 4
that resjudicata bars "inefficient" pleading and thus truth finding to a certain extent.
Yet resjudicata precludes the litigation or relitigation of claims that were or could
have been decided in a previous action between the same parties or their privies, and
is thus designed to encourage the resolution of as many claims as possible in one
action. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
126 SeeAstor Chauffeured Limousine v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540,1548
(7th Cir. 1990).
'27 See, e.g., Hankin, Alternative and Hypothetical Pleadings, 33 YALE L.J. 365, 367
(1924) (noting that "[tihe courts must recognize the fact that there is bound to be
some uncertainty on the part of the pleader").128 See FED. R. CIv. P. 26-37; House Hearings, supra note 118, at 98 (statement of
Edgar Tolman).
'
2 9 See E. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure 7-10 (1938)
(unpublished manuscript) (available in Charles E. Clark Papers, Manuscripts and
Archives, Yale University Library, Box 104, Folder 34).
50 See generally Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) (holding that giving
adequate notice of claims is the only purpose of pleadings under the Federal rules);
Garman v. Griffin, 666 F.2d 1156, 1158-59 (8th Cir. 1981) (discussing notice) (citing
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 265 at 634 (2d ed. 1972)); C. CLARK, supra note 23, at 254-
58 (2d ed. 1947) (stating that "the questions in each case should be [whether] the
pleader truthfully stat[ed] his own position and [gave] fair notice").
131 Dean Clark was the Reporter for the committee that drafted the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Dean of Yale Law School, and a judge on the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals.
132 See C. CLARK, supra note 23, at 497-98 & n.212.
133 Id. at 631-32.
Id. at 632.
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While Clark argued these points in the context of a single
action, they are equally valid when applied to pleading between
separate actions. To work "substantial justice" in the second action,
it might be necessary to permit a litigant to change positions;
13 5
if a party has a right to present her version of a case in one action,
then she should have the same right in any subsequent action.
Following this reasoning, the only time a party should be estopped
from pleading an inconsistent statement, even in two different
proceedings, is when it is plain that she has violated Rule 11.136
Many sources, however, note a basic difference between
permitting inconsistent pleadings within the confines of one action
and doing so between two separate actions. If the inconsistency
arises in a single case, the court will adopt only one of the inconsis-
tent statements, but if the inconsistency arises in separate proceed-
ings, the first court might adopt one statement as true, while the
second court adopts the opposing statement.137 This argument,
however, overlooks the possibility that a pleader may have a valid
reason to plead inconsistently other than mistake, inadvertence, or
fraud, the standard exceptions to judicial estoppel.13 8 For exam-
ple, in Konstantinidis v. Chen, 139 the district court estopped the
plaintiff from pleading that the defendant's alleged medical
malpractice had caused the plaintiffs disability. The plaintiff
maintained that the disability resulted from an acupuncture
treatment administered by the defendant doctor, when a needle tip
broke off and lodged in the plaintiffs neck. The district court
applied judicial estoppel because the plaintiff had claimed in an
earlier workmen's compensation action that his disability had been
caused by an accident. 140 The plaintiff may have pleaded the
inconsistency in good faith, however, because neither the plaintiff
nor his attorney could have known the true cause of his disability at
the time.14 1 Yet neither he nor his lawyer could be said to have
been mistaken, 142 inadvertent, or the victim of fraud, since the
15 See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing Konstantinidis).
136 Cf. Astor Chauffeured Limousine v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540,1548
(7th Cir. 1990) ("inconsistency probably demonstrates a violation of" Rule 11).
137 See, e.g., Astor Limousine, 910 F.2d at 1548 (noting that, within a case,
"[i]nconsistency is acceptable because, at the end of the day, only one of [the
inconsistent] positions can obtain"); RefurbishingaJudicial Shield, supra note 1, at 420-
25 (noting the federal courts' limited use ofjudicial estoppel in two separate trials).
138 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
139 626 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
140 See id. at 935-36.
141 See id. at 940.
142 The only way to bring this case within the "mistake" exception is if the mistake
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plaintiff's neurosurgeon believed at the time of the earlier action
that the broken needle tip had no effect on the plaintiff's condi-
tion.
143
At the very least, this case points out the need for another
exception to judicial estoppel in those jurisdictions that apply
judicial estoppel: the excuse that the party did not have a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the prior position. 144 Proponents of
the doctrine might argue that a party's own admission of a position
constitutes a waiver of the right to relitigate that point. That
argument forgets that the primary purpose of pleadings in the
modem system is to give notice to the opposing party.1 45 As one
court noted, parties often assert positions which they know they may
not be able to prove for tactical and other reasons.1 46 Thus the
mere fact that an assertion was made should not constitute a waiver
of the opportunity to relitigate it.
147
B. Responding to Changing Factual Situations
Permitting inconsistent pleading in separate actions also helps
discourage reliance on "obsolete or erroneous" decisions.1 48  In
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 149 the Court stated that collateral estoppel
was meant only to prevent relitigation of matters which "have
remained substantially static, factually and legally."150  This lan-
guage recognizes that facts can change over time. Therefore, a
party can plead that "X is true" and win because of it today, and yet
exception were held to apply to anyone involved in making a prior statement,
including those simply furnishing some of the underlying information. But if that
were the case, judicial estoppel would never apply, because a litigant seeking to
change positions could always find someone who had been "mistaken," and the
exception would swallow the rule.
And even if this were true, somejurisdictions might still permit estoppel. See
Hicks v. Andrew Johnson Bank, No. 137 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Mar. 16, 1990)
(LEXIS, States library, Tenn file); Rosa v. CWJ Contractors, Ltd., 4 Haw. App. 210,
218 n.12, 664 P.2d 745, 751 n. 12 (1983).
144 See infra note 222 and accompanying text. It is uncertain, however, whether
this new exception would have alleviated the problem in Konstantlinidis, because we
cannot be sure whether further litigation in the original case would have uncovered
the malpractice.
145 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
145 See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
147 But note that this practice might not always be useful. See supra note 144.
148 See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948).
149 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
150 Id. at 599.
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be required151 to say that "X is false" in another action years
later, because the facts have changed.152 The current exceptions
to judicial estoppel would not encompass this situation, and all
jurisdictions that accept the doctrine would bar the later state-
ment.153 Thus, permitting inconsistent or alternative pleading is
necessary to enable litigants to respond to situations in which the
"controlling facts" have changed, 154 whether that change occurs
during one case or from one case to another.155 A proponent of
judicial estoppel might claim that under changed circumstances,
conflicting assertions are not actually inconsistent. Judicial
estoppel, however, examines the facial consistency of the assertions
in question, rather than the facts behind them.
156
151 Required, for example, by FED. R. CIV. P. 1I's threat of sanctions.
152 This would not be covered by the exception tojudicial estoppel for "mistakes,"
since at the time of the first assertion, it was true. It would stretch the meaning of
the word "mistake" beyond all limits to say that one who asserted something that was
true could have been "mistaken." However, one could say that he was guilty of a
tactical error, as was the plaintiff in the introductory hypothetical.
153 Cf. Kalikow 78/79 Co. v. State, No. 41299-89, slip op. at 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
filed Feb. 2, 1990) (plaintiffs judicially estopped from asking for relief that, in the
opinion of the court, would have raised property taxes, when they previously claimed
that their property tax assessments were too high).
154 See Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 599-600 (noting that collateral estoppel is designed to
prevent "repetitious lawsuits over matters which have once been decided and which
have remained substantially static, factually and legally .... [T]he matter raised in the
second suit [must be] identical in all respects with that decided in the first proceeding
and.., the controlling facts and applicable legal rules [must] remain unchanged").
155 See the discussion of Kalikow 78/79 Co., supra note 17, from which the
following explanatory hypothetical is constructed: A sues B on a cause of action
which requires him to prove that fact "X" is true, and wins on the merits. Several
years pass, and fact "X" ceases to be true. A then wishes to assert a new cause of
action against C, requiring proof that fact "X" is false. Surely A should not be
estopped from so pleading, since an estoppel would be manifestly unjust. Cf. Sunnen,
333 U.S. at 599 ("collateral estoppel must be used.., so as to avoid injustice").
16 The fallacy of requiring facial consistency can best be exposed by varying the
facts of Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39 (1857), discussed supra notes
38-42 and accompanying text. Suppose that at the time of the first action, Hamilton
was a clerk, but that by the time of the second action, he had become a partner in the
business. As the Tennessee courts appliedjudicial estoppel in 1857 and apply it now,
they would look only to the fact that he had asserted, in the first action, that he was
a clerk. The statements "I am just a clerk" and "I am a partner in the business" are
facially inconsistent. The only way to state that they are not inconsistent is to permit
the introduction of the first statement as evidence against the truth of the later
statement, subject to rebuttal. See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
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C. Policies Behind the Adoption of Rule 8(e)(2)
This Comment will now turn to an examination of the specific
reasons given for the adoption of Rule 8(e)(2), which permits
inconsistent and alternative pleading in federal courts. Reliance
upon summary judgment and discovery was especially important to
the drafters of the federal rules. One drafter, Dean Clark, preferred
disposing of cases through summary judgment, rather than using
motions to dismiss on the basis of the pleadings, because this made
the discovery process available to clarify the facts.157 One com-
mentator has suggested that the entire basis of the federal rules
rests on the use of pretrial discovery to introduce and explore
factual theories for recovery.
158
Several members of the drafting committee noted that Rule 8
was drafted in order to align practice in the federal courts with the
developing jurisprudence in the state systems and equity rules.
159
In addition, discussions in committee hearings indicate that the
drafters specifically intended to allow plaintiffs and defendants to
make inconsistent pleadings. 160  Moreover, Attorney General
Mitchell, when testifying before the House of Representatives
regarding the proposed rules, stated that the whole point of Rule
8(e)(2) was to make "truth and merit" the ends of the system of
pleading, rather than encouraging blind obedience to technicali-
ties.
16 1
In a recent class action decision, Arizona v. Shamrock,162 the
Ninth Circuit supported this policy.1 63 The plaintiff class changed
its position not once, but three times, in separate actions, in
response to the facts disclosed by discovery.164 The court refused
to apply judicial estoppel to the plaintiffs, implicitly realizing that
157 See Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards For Rule 11 Sanctions, 100
HARV. L. REV. 630, 647 n. 87 (1987) [hereinafter Note,,Plausible Pleadings] (citing
SmithJudge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914,
927-28 (1976)).
158 See id. at 651.
159 See generally B. SHIPMAN, supra note 2, at 520 n.6 (discussing prior state and
equity practices); Hearings of the Committee to Draft the Proposed Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 741-a (Nov. 16, 1935) (available in Charles E. Clark Papers,
Manuscripts, and Archives, Yale University Library, Box 94, Folder 3) [hereinafter
Proposed Rules] (noting the desire to import those practices into the federal rules).
F60 See Proposed Rules, supra note 159, at 741-d, 741-e.
161 See House Hearings, supra note 118, at 24 (statement of Edgar Tolman).
162 729 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984).
163 Id. at 1215.
164 See id. at 1214-16.
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since the assertions in question might not actually have been
inconsistent, implicitly realizing that estopping the plaintiffs'
assertions would undermine their attempts to use the discovery
system as it was intended to be used.165
A final benefit of the system created by the federal rules,
particularly Rule 8(e)(2), was the creation of a highly liberalized
pleading system in which attorneys and parties were freer than in
the past (but now subject to Rule 11) to advance more creative legal
and factual theories.
166
III. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH
PERMITTING OR ENCOURAGING ALTERNATIVE
AND INCONSISTENT PLEADING
At the outset, we may separate the formulations of judicial
estoppel into two categories, those that permit its application to
inconsistent assertions made within a single proceeding and those
that do not. The former are plainly barred, at least in the federal
courts, by Rule 8(e)(2), 167 while the latter does not fall within the
language of that rule.168 Federal courts that have rejected judicial
estoppel have done so because they perceived a conflict between
165 See id. at 1215-1216; supra note 128 and accompanying text; ef. Giannone v.
United States Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544, 548 (3d Cir. 1956) (stating that certain uses
of pleadings as evidence would discourage the use of alternative and inconsistent
pleadings and discovery).
166 See Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 157, at 634 n.18 (discussing the
unintended impact of Rule 11 on the liberal standard of pleading).
167 The rule reads:
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the
alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or
defenses as the party has regardless of consistency, and whether based on
legal, equitable, or maritime grounds. All statements shall be made subject
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2); cf. Refurbishing a Judicial Shield supra note 1, at 418 n.56
(noting that the "'[i]nconsistent position doctrine must not be allowed to interfere
with [Rule 8(e)(2)] within a single action'" (citations omitted)). Presumably such a
doctrine would also be barred in a state whose pleading rules were substantially
similar to the Federal Rules. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 3014 (Consol. 1990)
("Separate causes of action or defenses.., maybe stated regardless of consistency").
168 See e.g., Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1217 n.3 (6th Cir.
1990) ("The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not clash with the right to plead
inconsistent claims under FED. R. CIv. P. 8(e)(2).").
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judicial estoppel and the purpose or spirit underlying Rule
8(e)(2).169 This section will argue both that the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning in Parkinson v. California Co. 170 was correct, and that
additional reasons for rejecting judicial estoppel are applicable to
systems that do not advocate or permit inconsistent or alternative
pleading.
In Parkinson, the Tenth Circuit was asked to apply judicial
estoppel to a plaintiff who had pending complaints in both state and
federal court arising from the same incident against separate
defendants. 171 Parkinson involved the explosion of propane gas
that had not been "malodorized." The plaintiff, Parkinson, initiated
an action in a Wyoming court against the California Company and
Stanolind Oil and Gas ("the federal defendants") and two others.
California Company and Stanolind Oil demurred to that complaint,
and Parkinson moved to dismiss the state action against them. This
left the state complaint alive against the two other parties.
Parkinson then instituted an action in federal district court solely
against the federal defendants. The two complaints alleged the
same negligent behavior, failure to malodorize the propane gas, but
the federal complaint claimed that the federal defendants were
responsible for the explosion, while the state complaint claimed that
the remaining state defendants were at fault.172  The Tenth
Circuit refused to apply the doctrine, 173 and in sweeping language
rejected the viability ofjudicial estoppel in the Tenth Circuit, stating
that to permit its use "would not be in keeping with the spirit of...
rule 8(e)(2)... and would discourage the determination of cases on
the basis of the true facts as they might be established ultimately."
174
169 See Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438 (loth Cir. 1956).
170 233 F.2d 432 (loth Cir. 1956).
171 See id. at 434-35.
172 See id. at 434-35.
173 The Parkinson court noted that the pleadings involved were not actually
inconsistent, but rather one omitted facts contained in the other. See id. at 438.
Although that interpretation was correctwhen the state action was initiated, itwas no
longer true after the state action was dismissed against the federal defendants. The
effect of the dismissal was that the state action claimed the state defendants were the
cause of the explosion, while the federal action claimed the federal defendants were
the cause of the explosion. See id. at 434-35.
174 Id. at 438. The Tenth Circuit's language seems to recognize, implicitly, the
potential for inconsistent decisions, yet does not seem bothered by this possibility.
The court stated that there were better ways to accomplish the goals ofjudicial
estoppel that to suppress the exposition of the truth in the future. See id. When
coupled with the court's recognition that the trier-of-fact, when faced with evidence
of the prior assertions, might disregard them and come to the opposite conclusion,
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The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its holding last year in Dugan v.
EMS Helicopters, Inc.,175 in which the court cited Parkinson for the
proposition that judicial estoppel is not a viable legal theory in the
Tenth Circuit. 176 In addition, other courts have relied on Parkin-
son in order to sustain similar holdings. 177 One commentator
wrote that the Parkinson court failed to note that Rule 8(e)(2) does
not permit "bad faith inconsistency." 7 8 The problem is that the
author assumes what he seeks to prove-that a litigant seeking to
contradict an assertion that she had made in a prior case and that
was adopted by a prior court is necessarily guilty of bad faith.
1 79
One need look only as far as Konstantinidis v. Chen'80 to see that
this is a faulty assumption.' 8 ' In Konstantinidis, the plaintiff
harbored an honest post-litigation doubt about what caused his
injuries, and most likely, with the information available at the time
of the first suit, his only option was to assert the positions that he
later controverted.
1 8 2
The reasoning used by the Tenth Circuit in Parkinson, that
permitting judicial estoppel violates the spirit of Rule 8(e)(2) and
the federal rules in general, is not as bizarre as it might seem. In
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Founda-
tion,183 a case which heralded the demise of mutuality of estoppel,
Justice White cited, with approval, a district court's holding that an
earlier Supreme Court decision "conflicted ... with the spirit of
certain provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
184
this case suggests that the Tenth Circuit was willing to accept the existence of
inconsistent results. See id.
175 915 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1990).
176 See id. at 1431-32. And to make the point absolutely clear, the Tenth Circuit
recently stated that "this court does not recognize the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel."
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1520 n.10 (10th Cir.
1991).
177 See Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Keebler Co. v.
Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 373 n.7 (1st Cir.1980).
178 See Refurbishing a Judicial Shield, supra note 1, at 422.
179 See id. at 422-23.
'80 26 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
181 See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
182 Seesupra note 141 and accompanying text; see also Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit
Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 373 n.7 (1st Cir. 1980) (defendant sought to introduce
affirmative defense that was directly inconsistent with assertion made in earlier
registration proceeding). Butsee Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834
F.2d 208, 212-14 (1st Cir. 1987) (party asking for inconsistent relief in bad faith).
183 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
184 Id. at 318 n.5 (citing Technograph Printed Circuit, Ltd. v. Packard Bell Elec.
Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308, 317-19 (C.D. Cal. 1968)).
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Thus, the Tenth Circuit was correct to examine judicial estoppel in
light of the purpose of Rule 8(e)(2).
Other courts have applied similar analyses in other situa-
tions.18 5 Judge Learned Hand argued that judicial estoppel was
"plainly contrary to the underlying basis" of the whole doctrine of
estoppel.1 6 Similarly, the Third Circuit made known its discom-
fort with certain aspects of judicial estoppel, stating that it thought
the policy behind Rule 8(e)(2) would be undermined if allegations
made in prior pleadings were admitted as evidence against their
pleader, saying that "[p]arties will hesitate to make notice-giving
allegations at the risk of their being used as evidence .. . .187
This policy consideration is not a relic of the 1950s; a majority of
the federal courts now hold this view.18 8 If the admission of prior
pleadings as evidence conflicts with the policies that underlie a rule
permitting inconsistent pleading, then their admission as conclusive
evidence is even worse.
One objection to Parkinson is that the court did not explain what
this "conflict" was. 189 The Tenth Circuit's objection was that
permitting judicial estoppel would "irrevocably freeze[]" whatever
assertions the pleader had made in his initial action.190 Any
185 State courts, as well as federal courts, have applied this mode of analysis. The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma recently showed a willingness to consider overturning
its long-standing policy of permitting judicial estoppel, in light of changes to the
Oklahoma Pleading Code which bring the code more in line with the federal rules.
See Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276, 286 n.43 (Okla. 1990).
That court held the doctrine inapplicable to the case at bar as the inconsistent
asserted positions related to legal theories, not matters of fact, and thus declined to
decide the question of the doctrine's continued validity. See id. at 286-87.
186 Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 248 F.2d 833, 837 (2d Cir.
1957) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958).
187 Giannone v. United States Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544, 548 (3d Cir. 1956). The
court, however, declined to rule on that question.
An easy way around this problem is to say that judicial estoppel should only
apply to pure assertions of known facts, as opposed to notice-giving allegations. The
problem is how to distinguish these without admitting the prior pleadings as evidence
subject to explanation, and thus eviscerating the doctrine. The Parkinson court was
aware of this distinction and took it into account in its decision, finding that in
general, "the allegations of a complaint maybe pierced by uncontradicted evidentiary
matter and in such event, will not be deemed sufficient to raise a genuine fact issue."
Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 439 (10th Cir. 1956).
188 See e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Sherman, 439 F.2d 1294, 1298 (5th Cir. 1971)
(noting the conflict); Garman v. Griffin, 666 F.2d 1156, 1159 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding
Continental to express the majority view); see also Refurbishing a judicial Shield supra
note 1, at 420 n.72 (collecting cases).
189 See Refurbishing aJudicial Shield supra note 1, at 422.
19o See Parkinson, 233 F.2d at 438.
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doctrine that freezes earlier assertions because they have been made
to and accepted by another court completely frustrates Rule
8(e)(2)'s policy of getting to the merits1 91 by ignoring the fact that
judges and juries make mistakes, and that "facts" can either change
with time or be unprovable at a certain time.
1 92
This Comment noted that a major concern of the drafters of the
pleading rules has been the search for the truth. 193 The Supreme
Court has noted that estoppels which "blockade[] unexplored paths
that may lead to truth" are to be applied with great caution.
1 94
In most cases, when a party is judicially estopped from asserting a
position, that will end its action and foreclose all further inquiry
into the underlying claim; this result plainly conflicts with the truth-
seeking function of the courts.
195
Judicial estoppel seeks to dispose of a case on the pleadings
alone, which plainly conflicts with a policy of encouraging discovery
and summary judgement in the disposition of cases.196 The effect
is to force attorneys to plead with an eye to avoiding judicial
estoppel, rather than with an eye to complying with the liberal
policies of modern pleading systems. This effect has been criticized
with respect to other judge-made policies impinging on the "spirit"
of the federal rules. 197 Judicial estoppel clearly conflicts with the
policy of discouraging reliance on obsolete decisions.
198  If
judicial estoppel were permitted to run free, a plaintiff could not
hope to correct a previously correct assertion that had become incorrect.
191 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
192 For example, it appears that with the medical evidence available to Mr.
Konstantinidis at the time of his second action, he would have been unable to prove
the assertion, which he later sought to demonstrate, that the broken needle was one
cause of his injuries. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 118-34 and accompanying text.
194 Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979). See also Hankin, supra note 127,
at 368 (precluding alternative assertions may deny a litigant the right to assert the
truth).
195 Some would say that the litigant has made his bed and must now sleep in it.
However, as the introductory hypothetical and the facts of Kalikow 78/79 Co. v.
State, No. 41299-89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Feb. 2, 1990) show, this is not simply a
question of holding someone to a decision in order to prevent bad faith-the doctrine
is capable of causing great harm to litigants who do not try to "play fast and loose"
with the courts, and who even attempt to aid the courts through tactical decisions.
196 See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
197 For a criticism of expanded judicial use of Rule 11 sanctions as undermining
the pleading system created by the federal rules, see Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra
note 157.
198 See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948) for a discussion of
decisions that have become obsolete due to changes in the underlying facts or law.
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Beyond conflicting with the spirit of the federal rules, other
objections may be leveled at judicial estoppel. First, in order to
apply the doctrine, a court must analyze th6 consistency of the
pleadings, and this analysis may in itself be flawed. In fact, this
consistency analysis has been criticized as being ad hoc. 199 The
problem lies with the "close cases" which appear facially inconsis-
tent, but may not be.2° ° In these situations, courts should heed
Rule 8(f), which states that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as
to do substantial justice," and resolve doubts regarding consistency
in favor of consistency. This approach would be consistent with one
approach to Rule 11, which has been interpreted to be inapplicable
when reasonable attorneys would agree that the pleading presented
plausible claims.2" 1 If one of the purposes behind judicial estop-
pel is to preserve judicial resources, then failure to resolve doubts
in favor of consistency clearly goes against this purpose, as it
lengthens the judicial process by requiring appeals and
remands.212  The tendency of other preclusion doctrines to
promote inefficiency has been noted by Professor Brunet.
203
Brunet's analysis depended on the ease with which the requirements
of collateral estoppel can be twisted around a set of facts. This
leads to a large number of appeals on estoppel findings.20 4 Due
199 SeeJacksonJordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1984) ("Because of the absence of defined principles, [judicial estoppel] has been
criticized, as it is basically an 'ad hoe' decision in each case.").
200 For examples of "dose cases," see United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, More
or Less, 802 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1986) and Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432
(10th Cir. 1956).
201 See Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 157, at 651 (arguing for such an
approach).
2 02 See e.g.,JacksonJordan, 747 F.2d at 1578-80 (reversing finding of inconsistency);
Ellis v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436, 440 (10th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 964 (1980);Johnson Serv. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 164, 175
(5th Cir. 1973) (finding no inconsistent positions, and arguing against resolving
doubts in favor of estoppel).
203 See Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The Efficiency
of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REv. 701, 719-20 (1978).
201 Noting that "determinations of questions of law should reflect the goal of
justice and prevent harmful side effects," id. at 710, Brunet went on to remark that
[a]lthough collateral estoppel is designed to achieve efficiency by avoiding
duplicative trials on identical issues, the complexity of its preclusion norms
warrants minimizing the need to consider whether collateral estoppel
applies. The court's determination of intricate questions of issue preclusion
increases the likelihood of appeals, thereby adding to the social cost to the
litigants and taxpayers of dispute resolution.
Id. at 719-20 (footnote omitted).
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to the greater malleability ofjudicial estoppel, that reasoning is even
more applicable to it.
Judicial estoppel also conflicts with another of its own justifica-
tions-preserving the dignity of the courts and the sanctity of the
oath.20 5  In Farley v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 206 the Louisiana
Supreme Court noted that it was inherently inequitable to punish
someone, even if he had "played fast and loose" with the courts, by
refusing to permit him to have his case decided upon its mer-
its. 20 7 In that case, a settlement of the prior action had resulted
in the court entering judgment on a stipulation by the parties.
208
The Louisiana Supreme Court felt that it was better to punish them
in some other way, more suited to the "wrong" that they had
committed, than to sacrifice a potentially meritorious suit.2 0 9 The
Tenth Circuit seized upon this idea in Parkinson, saying that even
when it came to outright perjury, "public policy [could] be vindicat-
ed otherwise-and more practicably and fairly in most instances-
than through suppression of truth in the future."
210
Another objection to the Parkinson holding might be that Rule
8(e)(2) permits pleading inconsistent causes of action or defenses,
but not inconsistent facts.2 11 Once again, however, the comments
of the drafters of the federal rules overcome this objection by
noting that Rule 8(e)(2) is an attempt to codify the famous "kettle
case" defense, where purely inconsistent facts were pled.2 1 2 Since
205 See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
206 133 La. 497, 63 So. 122 (1913).
207 Admittedly this value judgment is open to debate. The intent of this
Comment, however, is to show that the balance of the debate tips, even ifjust slightly,
away from utilizing judicial estoppel. It seems better to elicit the truth and then
punish abusers of the judicial system than to permit factually incorrect decisions to
stand as barriers to legitimate recoveries.
208 See id. at 503, 63 So. at 123-24.
209 See id. at 544-45, 63 So. at 138; supra note 91 and accompanying text.
210 Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438 (10th Cir. 1956). See also
Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing Parkinson
favorably).
211 Cf. Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540,
1548 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing the difference between pleading facts and theories
of recovery).
212 The drafters' model for a Rule 8(e)(2) defense was the famous British "kettle
case," in which "[t]he allegation was that the defendant borowed [sic] the plaintiff's
kettle in a new condition and returned it greatly damaged. The defendant put in a
defence, first, 'I never borrowed it; second, it was cracked when I got it; and third,
it was all right when I returned it.'" See Proposed Rules, supra note 159, at 741-d,
741-c (statement of Mr. Donworth); see also Astor Limousine, 910 F.2d at 1548 (noting
a similar defensive posture).
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the rule is not limited to defensive use, it must permit a plaintiff to
plead inconsistent facts, as opposed to theories of recovery.213 In
fact it is difficult to imagine how one could be expected to plead
two or more inconsistent causes of action without at the same time
alleging inconsistent facts. Thus, inconsistent causes of action must
subsume inconsistent factual allegations in Rule 8(e)(2).
The foregoing discussion has shown that judicial estoppel is
precluded not by the rules that encourage inconsistent pleading
themselves, but rather by the policies underlying such rules.
Analysis of common law doctrines in this manner is both accepted
and productive. Use of the doctrine is also inherently tilted toward
disparaging the very policies it was designed to uphold.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW PROCEDURAL SYSTEM TO
REPLACE JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
Even if judicial estoppel were eliminated, as Section III urges,
the problems that it was designed to prevent and the policies that
it was designed to further would still remain. This section argues
for the adoption of a new evidentiary presumption and increased
use of Rule 11 sanctions, both against litigants and their attorneys.
These proposals, taken together, would replacejudicial estoppel and
be immune to most of the above criticisms.
214
The doctrines of equitable estoppel, collateral estoppel and res
judicata can and should be invoked to dispose of the majority of
judicial estoppel cases.215 The Louisiana Supreme Court ad-
vanced this argument in 1913, questioning seriously the validity of
the doctrine as a tool to preserve the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess.
216
In this respect, it is useful to categorize those types of cases that
are amenable to disposition through other forms of estoppel. In the
213 See Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1217 n.3 (6th Cir. 1990); cf.
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922,928-
30 (1991) (noting that Rule 11 was to be given its plain meaning, and finding no
contrary intent in the Advisory Committee's comments).
214 Unfortunately, a similar objection applies to the use of prior pleadings as
evidence against the pleader. This section will thus argue that with proper
safeguards, that objection will be rendered less threatening, if not removed entirely.
215 See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
216 See Farley v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 133 La. 497, 63 So. 122 (1913). The
Farey Court articulated the Louisiana rule that prior assertions do not become
conclusive evidence against the pleader unless there is reliance and prejudice. See id.
at 514, 63 So. at 137.
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analyses that follow, "A" denotes a party asserting estoppel against
"B." In order to ensure that B's assertion could have been litigated
in the prior action, this section assumes that the assertion is
logically inconsistent with one made in a previous action. To
reiterate, these cases can be categorized by looking at four charac-
teristics: privity or sameness of parties, successful maintenance of
the assertion in question, reliance by the opposing party on that
assertion, and prejudice to the opposing party resulting from
reversal of that assertion.
If there is privity or sameness of parties, the case is amenable to
res judicata21 7 and possibly equitable estoppel.218 If there is
not privity or sameness of parties, but the assertion was successfully
maintained, then the case is amenable to the use of collateral
estoppel, for then the issue must actually have been litigated.2 19
Thus, the only situations in which a court might need to apply
judicial estoppel are when there is no privity or sameness of parties
and the assertion was not successfully maintained.
For those cases, the prior pleadings should be admitted as
evidence against B to create a bursting bubble presumption 2 20 as
to the validity of the prior assertion.2 21 The court should then
permit B to come forward with evidence, in the form of affidavits
if necessary to withstand a motion for summary judgment, to rebut
the presumption. Such evidence could include proof of a lack of
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the previous action,
perhaps due to burden of proof or discovery differences, fraud,
honest mistake, inadvertence, changed facts, or unavailability of
facts at the time of the prior assertion.2 2 If B successfully rebuts
2 17 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
220 This presumption would be governed by FED. R. EVID. 301: "In all civil actions
and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption," and would hence disappear
in the face of evidence sufficient to rebut it. See Tenneco Chem. v. William T.
Burnett & Co., 691 F.2d 658, 663 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating that "it is axiomatic that a
presumption is not evidence and disappears in the face of evidence sufficient to rebut
it" (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1343 (Ct. CL. 1975))).
221 Contrast this with the implicit presumption created byjudicial estoppel that
anyparty seeking to reverse a prior position does so in bad faith.
' For general exceptions to collateral estoppel, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS, § 28 (1982). It is likely that most of the cases in which there was no
reason to disturb the prior holding would be disposed of on partial summary
judgment as follows: A would move for partial summaryjudgment, submitting a copy
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the presumption, the case should go forward on the merits. If not,
the issue should be deemed established as it was previously asserted,
and the court should grant A partial summary judgment on that
issue if appropriate. The court should then move to consider
imposing sanctions on both the attorney and the litigant.228 This
would allow the court to determine the truth in light of all the facts
available to the pleader seeking to change positions, as suggested by
Parkinson.
224
This approach will protect the sanctity of the oath by presuming
the validity of a prior pleading, while not blindly following its
assertions in the face of evidence to the contrary.225 It also
protects the integrity and dignity of the judicial process by showing
that the courts will settle disputes with reference to the best
available approximation of the truth, admitting the frailties of the
judicial process, while punishing those who actually abuse it, rather
than who are presumed to have abused it. Finally, it permits great
latitude in pleading, while allowing the courts to dispose of cases via
summary judgment and motions to dismiss when proper.
The court might determine that the assertion of the incorrect
position did not violate Rule 11, for example, because "reasonable
inquiry" into the facts at the time of the assertion would not have
revealed the latterly discovered truth. This should be the outcome
in a case with facts similar to Konstantinidis if the court determines
that there has been no perjury or Rule 11 violation. In some cases,
however, the court will determine that there has been a violation.
Misconduct by the party seeking to change positions could arise
in two forms. First, and easiest to deal with, is when the court
determines that the party originally asserted the truthful position in
the first action, and sought to perjure itself in the later action. The
court could then sanction the offending party under Rule 11,226
of the prior pleading(s) with his motion papers. B would then submit whatever
evidence he could muster in an attempt to rebut the presumption. If successful, the
case would go forward on the merits. If not, it could go forward on any issues that
were left open in light of conclusive determinations by prior assertions.
223 Cf. C. CLARK, supra note 23, at 632 (arguing that in the case of defenses, the
issue of sanctions against both counsel and party should never be considered unless
the 4leading was "so false as to be stricken").
" See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
2 But see the seventy cases cited in Farley v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 133 La.
497, 538-39, 63 So. 122, 136 (1913) (holding that previous assertions estop pleaders
from contradicting them even if it is clear that the previous assertions were false).
26 Recently, the Supreme Court held that the 1983 amendments to Rule 11
impose an objective standard of reasonable inquiry into the facts on both a
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or under its inherent power to sanction, and refer the charge of
perjury to the appropriate authority,227 while according preclusive
effect to the prior position.
But what if the court determines that the party seeking to
change positions is telling the truth in the instant action, having
committed perjury in the previous action? Contrary to the beliefs
of those who favor judicial estoppel, it is not necessary to have
inconsistent decisions in the two actions. First, the trial judge might
refer the possible perjury charges to the United States Attorney, or
state attorney general, for investigation and disposition.
228
Unfortunately, the statute of limitations for perjury is limited to five
years, at least in the federal system.229 The Supreme Court has
acknowledged this difficulty for many years, but has accepted that
it is neither possible nor desirable to punish someone for defraud-
ing or misbehaving toward a court after the statute of limitations
has run.23 0 Thus, a party might escape punishment for perjury if
the initial action occurred more than five years before the second
action.
Punishing the party for perjury only takes care of half of the
inquiry, however. The possibility of inconsistent judgements still
remains. In the federal system, at least, that situation can be
remedied.23 1 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
litigant may make a motion or institute a separate action under Rule
60(b) 232 to reopen a previous judgment. Assuming that the party
represented party as well as his attorney. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Communications Enters., Inc. 111 S. Ct. 922, 933 (1991). Thus, both the party and
his attorney now may be sanctioned under similar, if not identical, standards. Cf. id.
(stating that the reasonability standards will not always be identical). Since aparty
will typically be given more leeway even under the new objective standard, this could
mean that once it has been determined that the party violated Rule 11, the attorney's
violation would be clear as well, upon a finding that he acquiesced in or encouraged
the party's actions.
-7 In the federal court system, the perjury would be reported to the United States
Attorney for that district.
228 In the federal system, perjury is defined and its punishment prescribed in 18
U.S.C. §§ 1621-1623 (1988).
229 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988).
230 See Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943).
231 The discussion that follows also applies to state court systems whose rules of
civil procedure have an analog to FED. R. CIV. P. 60. For example, New York CPLR
Rule 5015 is substantially similar to federal Rule 60 in that it allows "any interested
person" to move the court that rendered the offending judgment to relieve the
parties of that judgment for the same reasons as Rule 60. See N.Y. Cv. PRAc. L. &
R. 5015(a) (Consol. 1990).
232 Rule 60(b) states:
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who was the victim of the perjury in the previous action was not a
party to the present action, the court could require the United
States Attorney to bring its finding of perjury to that party's
attention. That party could then bring its action or motion in the
same court that heard the previous action or in any other district
court that was convenient, including the one in which the later
action took place.
233
Motions under Rule 60(b) are subject to a one year limitations
period from the date of entry of the judgment, but some circuits
have held that independent actions to reopen old judgments are not
subject to any limitations period,2M except when required by
justice through the doctrine of laches23 5 or statutes of limitations
that arise from outside the rule.236 The Supreme Court has also
held that no limitations period applies to a motion under Rule
(B) MISTAKES; INADVERTENCE; EXCUSABLE NEGLECT; NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE; FRAUD, ETC. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party;.., or (6) any other reasonjustifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for
reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order,
or proceeding was entered or taken .... This rule does not limit the power
of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order, or proceeding, .. . or to set aside ajudgment for fraud
upon the court.
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Note that when a party seeks to reopen ajudgment under'Rule
60(b), it must prove the misconduct of the opposing party by clear and convincing
evidence. See Square Construction Co. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 657
F.2d 68, 71 (4th Cir. 1981).
23s See Locklin v. Switzer Bros., 335 F.2d 331 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962
(1964), reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 926 (1965). But see Lapin v. Shulton, Inc., 333 F.2d 169
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964) (holding that a new court should deny
jurisdiction to hear such a case and remand to the prior court if the prior court is
capable of rendering the relief requested).
2' See, e.g., Kupferman v. Consolidated Research and Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072
(2d Cir. 1972) (applying Rule 60(b) to a ten-year-old judgment); Chrysler Corp. v.
Superior Dodge, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1979) (similar).
P23 See Crosby v. Mills, 413 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that only laches
applies).
236 See Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 927 (1970) (holding that laches and other statutes of limitations foreclosed
reopening a 33-year-old judgment).
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60(b)'s "any other reason" clause when reopening of the judgment
is required "to accomplish justice."
2 7
The only question is where the situation of perjury in the former
action fits into Rule 60(b)'s classification. Perjury has been held to
be intrinsic rather than extrinsic fraud, because perjury regarding
an issue material to the action is intimately bound up with the
substance of the action itself.238 At least one circuit has held that
perjury does not constitute proper grounds for relief under Rule
60(b),2 39 but long-standing precedent and Rule 60(b) amendments
that permit relief for intrinsic fraud indicate that such a holding is
incorrect, and that perjury does afford a basis for relief under Rule
60(b).
In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.,240 one of the
parties had perpetrated a continuing scheme to defraud both its
adversaries and the courts. The Court noted that while the policy
of ensuring finality of judgment was nearly absolute, courts going
back to pre-revolutionary England had made an exception for fraud
discovered after the close of the action, and had permitted
reopening of the judgment anytime after discovery of the
fraud. 241 The Court went on to hold that the exception required
proof of a scheme to defraud the courts and subvert the judicial
system, which would be much easier if it could be shown that a
party's attorney was somehow part of that scheme. The Court
specifically noted that perjury committed by an isolated witness,
without more, would not be sufficient to reopen a judgement.
242
Viewed from the proper angle, this description precisely
matches the situation sought to be covered by the "fast and loose"
rationale for judicial estoppel.243 In that situation, a court is
confronted with a party that had perjured itself in an earlier action
and then sought to continue to defraud by preventing another
adverse party from relying on the party's previous assertion. Any
difference between this situation and the Hazel scheme is merely
one of method. The advisory committee for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure specifically cited Hazel in its notes to the 1946
237 See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 609, 613-15 (1949).
238 See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Gore, 761 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1985).
239 See id.
240 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
241 See id. at 244.
242 See id. at 245-46.
243 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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amendment to Rule 60(b), which modified the rule to cover both
intrinsic and extrinsic fraud.
244
That interpretation has been confirmed by recent cases finding
perjury to be within one or more of Rule 60(b)'s categories. The
Fifth Circuit recently held that evidence of perjury in the prior
action is new evidence within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(2) because
it was in the control of the. perjuring party at all times and could not
have been discovered by its opponent at the time of that trial. As
such, it was grounds for a Rule 60(b)(2) motion, and by inference,
for an independent action as well.245 The Eighth Circuit, on the
other hand, held that proof of perjury in the former action
establishes fraud on the court under Rule 60(b)(3); if a party can
prove that the perjury deprived it of a full and fair opportunity to
litigate, it can reopen the judgment under that section.246 Finally,
perhaps in anticipation of inconsistent pleadings being used to
establish perjury, the Tenth Circuit recently held that inconsistent
testimony in a later action could provide grounds for a Rule
60(b)(3) motion, and by inference for an independent action, in the
discretion of the trial judge.247 These cases illustrate that when
a litigant has "played fast and loose" with the courts by perjuring
himself in a previous action and then seeking to assert inconsistent
positions, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal
Rules of Evidence together provide a mechanism by which the truth
can be told without the risk of two courts assuming inconsistent
positions.
The idea that prior pleadings could be evidence against the
pleader goes back centuries:
At common law the point has never been doubtful; the rule has
always been that while admissions made in other suits are of
course evidence, as being declarations against interest, and
therefore presumably true, they are no more conclusive, or
estoppels, than admissions made out of courts. In fact, the only
244 See FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note to the 1946 Amendment.
245 See Washington v. Patis, 916 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1990).
246 See Paige v. Sandbulte, 917 F.2d 1108, 1110-11 (8th Cir. 1990).
247 See Anderson v. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 907 F.2d 936, 952 (10th
Cir. 1990). It has also been held that the misconduct complained of under Rule
60(b)(3) need not have altered the result of the previous action in order to warrant
relief. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 924 (1st Cir. 1988). Rather, it
must have "affected the substantial rights of the [aggrieved party]." Id. Thus,
situations presenting opportunities to applyjudicial estoppel present an even more
compelling opportunity to apply Rule 60.
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doubt has been as to whether they were admissible in evidence at
all, when contained in pleadings at law, owing to the necessity
under which a party often finds himself in his pleadings at law to
make statements not because of his knowing them to be true, but
in order to meet possible contingencies, or developments, in the
case, with regard to which he has no information and yet is
required to plead with positiveness of assertion.248
The federal courts have agreed for decades. Parkinson was
decided on this issue; the court held that the inconsistent prior
pleadings were admissible as evidence, but not necessarily conclu-
sive, and could be "convincing, persuasive, or of little weight,
according to the particular circumstances. 249 The Third Circuit
rendered a similar decision in Giannone v. United States Steel
Corp.,250 and asked whether permitting the use of prior inconsis-
tent statements as evidence would defeat the policies behind Rule
8(e)(2).251
Strictly speaking, the Third Circuit was correct. Admitting the
prior assertions as evidence against the pleader will tend to
discourage pleading inconsistently and alternatively out of fears of
future repercussions in other actions. Admitting prior assertions,
however, will not implicate the major policy objection to judicial
estoppel of absolutely foreclosing access to the truth, because under
this scheme the prior assertions are admitted as presumptive
statements of fact subject to rebuttal on good grounds by the party
who made them. Indeed, only those actively planning the non-
testimonial equivalent of perjury will be hurt and discouraged by the
threat of admitting prior assertions, and those litigants and
attorneys are precisely the targets of judicial estoppel; parties
harboring good-faith doubts about what facts might ultimately be
determined at trial should not fear future admissions of those same
assertions, subject to rebuttal.
Federal courts have not veered from Parkinson's holding
regarding the probative value of inconsistent prior assertions.
252
248 Farley v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 133 La. 497, 542-543, 63 So. 122, 137
(1913).
249 Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438 (10th Cir. 1956).
250 238 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1956).
251 See id. at 548. See also Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 248 F.2d
833, 837 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hand, J., dissenting) (inconsistent pleadings admissible
against pleader, but not as conclusive evidence), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958).
2 See, e.g., In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 859, 861 (some probative
value), affd en bane, 542 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 723,
reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 975 (1977).
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Later cases, however, have focused on the admission of pleadings
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The latest case to discuss this
problem is Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc.,253 coincidentally one of
the cases in which the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed Parkinson. The
Dugan Court noted first that, in general, where a plaintiff files
different complaints against different defendants for the same
injuries, each complaint is admissible as evidence against the
other.2 54 The court noted the trend toward admitting prior
inconsistent pleadings as substantive evidence pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2),2 55 and the use of inconsistent plead-
ings for impeachment purposes under Federal Rule of Evidence
613.256 The Tenth Circuit stressed, however, that only prior
assertions that are directly contrary to current positions are
admissible. This admonition is fully consistent with resolving
doubts in favor of consistency.2 57 If no inconsistency exists, there
is no reason for an estoppel and also no reason for admitting the
prior assertions as evidence.
Although the foregoing discussion was grounded in the federal
courts, the states have not been delinquent in this area. For
example, Massachusetts specifically encourages the pleading system
favored by this Comment and has not adopted judicial estop-
pel.2 5' Texas, while approving of judicial estoppel, also has a
variant of this system, by means of its rules of evidence, which are
similar to the federal rules.2 59 Thus, while the discussion of
253 915 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1990).
2M See id. at 1432.
25 The rule provides that the following statements are not-hearsay:
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and
is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative
capacity or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption
or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party
to make a statement concerning the subject, ....
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). Prior pleadings will usually come in under FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(B) or 801(d)(2)(C).
I That rule provides as follows:
(A) EXAMINING WITNESS CONCERNING PRIOR STATEMENT. In examining a
witness concerning a prior statement made by the witness, whether written
or not, the statement need nbt be shown nor its contents disclosed to the
witness at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to
opposing counsel.
FED. R. EVID. 613 (a).
2 57 See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
5 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 87 (1985); Brown v. Gerstein, 17 Mass. App. Ct.
558, 568-69 n.19, 460 N.E.2d 1043, 1051 n.19 (1984).'
M See Herd Corp. v. Triple "J" Inv., Inc., No. B14-86-506-CV, slip op. at 8 n.3
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judicial estoppel's conflicts with systems encouraging inconsistent
pleading applies to state systems similar to the federal rules, the
suggested presumption of the validity of the prior assertion, subject
to rebuttal, also applies to similar state systems.
The discussion so far has centered on ensuring that truth not be
foreclosed based upon prior assertions. But judicial estoppel, at
least in some jurisdictions, 260 also seeks to protect the sanctity of
the oath and to protect the judicial system itself, rather than the
parties. This policy is strikingly similar to the one behind Rule
11.261 Rule 11262 now mand-tes sanctions against any lawyer
who files a pleading not well grounded in fact.263  The rule
specifically provides that if such a pleading is signed and filed, the
court shall impose "appropriate" sanctions on the attorney, the
party, or both, and may do this upon an opposing party's motion or
sua sponte.2c The fact that the sanctions may be imposed on the
court's own motion make this a very attractive substitute for judicial
estoppel. The sanctions are almost entirely within the discretion of
the judge and can include dismissing the case, payment of costs, and
attorney's fees.265 Using Rule 11 to strike the pleadings, which is
equivalent to dismissing the case if it is not possible to amend
without asserting the sanctioned material, is not favored under the
1983 amendments to the rule. 266 Rather, the Advisory Committee
favored imposing such sanctions through Rules 8, 12, or 56.267
The use of summary judgment together with such other sanctions
(Tex. App. 14 Dist., Sept. 24, 1987).
6 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
261 See generally Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 157, at 630 (discussing the
policies behind Rule 11 and its amendments, and proposing new interpretations of
its dictates).
262 For a discussion of Rule 11 as an estoppel device, see City of Kingsport, Tenn.
v. Steel and Roof Structure, Inc., 500 F.2d 617, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1974).
263 See Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 157, at 630 n.1; see also Business
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922, 933 (1991)
(holding represented parties to an objective standard of reasonable pre-filing inquiry,
especially with respect to facts under the control of the parties).
264 See Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 157, at 633 n.9. In fact, this was the
genesis of Business Guides. The district court, having done its own research into the
facts of the case, raised the prospect of Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte and referred the
case to a magistrate for action. See Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 926.
265 See Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 157, at 644 n. 19.
266 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advi;ory committee's note to the 1983 Amendment.
267 See id.
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
as the court might deem appropriate directly parallels the bursting
bubble presumption advocated in this Comment.
268
Why sanctions? If a true purpose of judicial estoppel is to
protect the integrity of the judicial system, then preventing the
assertion of the inconsistent positions completes only half of the job
and also hinders truth-finding. At most, the party's case is dis-
missed, and the attorney gets off scot-free. This is acceptable if
there was no bad faith involved, but if there was bad faith, this
result leaves the party and the attorney with no disincentive to try
again. Rule 11 sanctions, however, are different, both because they
act as potentially very strong deterrents and because they can be
tailored to deter without blocking access to the truth.269 Sanc-
tions are imposed to encourage parties to make more diligent
inquiry into the facts when contemplating the assertion of an
inconsistent position. Since most litigants must get into the courts
via attorneys, this provides a far stronger method for protection of
the judicial system than simply estopping the later assertions. Since
parties and attorneys are held to the same standard, the effect of
Rule 11 sanctions will most likely be even greater.
270
The placing of the formulation of the sanctions almost com-
pletely within the discretion of the trial judge is consistent with the
desire to protect the judicial system from abuse while still attempt-
ing to find the truth. The type of sanction used will vary according
to the purpose of sanctioning the offending party or attorney and
the facts of the case, since Rule 11 sanctions function both to deter
and compensate.27 1 As a deterrent, sanctions "may be a useful
tool in vindicating the court's authority, reminding those who need
reminding of the protocol, and ensuring orderliness of the judicial
process," 272 the first and last of which are very similar to some of
the goals ofjudicial estoppel. As compensation, sanctions recognize
that "playing fast and loose" with the courts hurts not only the
211 See supra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
269 See Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 157, at 649 n. 94 (noting the flexibility
built into the rule, and suggesting that deterrence is particularly valuable in cases in
which an attorney repeatedly files non-meritorious claims already dearly precluded).
270 Cf. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 922, 935 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the likely impact of the
majority's holding).
271 See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 394 (1st Cir. 1990); see also
Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 928 (discussing Rule I1's purpose of curbing litigation
abuses).
"2 Anderson, 900 F.2d at 395.
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judicial system, but the other parties as well.2  Judicial estoppel
cannot compensate its user for the costs forced upon her by her
opponent's misconduct, whereas Rule 11 is designed for just that
purpose.
274
In addition to Rule 11, federal judges also have an expansive
inherent power to sanction litigants. The Supreme Court recently
outlined that power in Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.,275 a case that
involved pervasive litigation abuses. The Court first noted that it is
a part of the inherent powers of a federal court to vacate its own
judgment upon proof that it has been the victim of fraud. 6
Moreover, a federal court can pursue its own investigation to
determine whether it has been defrauded. 277 The inherent power
reaches a broader class of conduct than does Rule 11 and, when bad
faith is present,278 it also includes conduct barred by Rule 11.
Finally, the Court noted that sanctions under the inherent power,
including the vacation of prior judgments, "may be imposed years
after ajudgment on the merits."
279
The Court's language in Chambers suggests that in the type of
case that judicial estoppel actually seeks to prevent, Rule 60280
might not even be necessary in order to correct the prior judgment.
Indeed, since the original court could undertake its own examina-
tion into the fraud once aware of it, the later parties might not need
to be involved at all. The inherent power to sanction is yet another
way that a federal court may -orrect past mistakes and punish
egregious behavior. ButJustice White's reasoning in Chambers, that
273 See id.
274 While "'Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute,'" Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 934
(citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447,2462 (1990)), the rule does
shift the costs of the "discrete event" that violated its standards. See id. In Business
Guides, the violation turned out to be the commencement of the action without
reasonable inquiry into the facts, leading the district court to award the defendant its
legal fees and expenses incurred in defending the improper action. See id. at 927.
Based upon that analysis, a federal court faced with a litigant "playing fast and loose
with the courts," as the plaintiff in Business Guides was, could award as sanctions the
opposing party's costs of litigating to dismissal. Cf. id.
2s 59 U.S.L.W. 4595 (U.S. June 6, 1991) (No. 90-256).
276 See id. at 4598.
277 See id. Presumably, this is similar to a federal judge's ability to raise the
possibility of Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
278 See 59 U.S.L.W. at 4599-600.
279 See id. at 4601 (emphasis added).
280 See supra notes 231-47 and accompanying text (discussing reopening prior
judgments using Rule 60).
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the inherent power to sanction is simply necessary for the federal
courts to function,281 probably applies to state courts as well.
CONCLUSION
Judicial estoppel was developed to meet the perceived needs of
protecting the judicial system at a time when rules of pleading were
strict and unforgiving. In those days it could be forgiven, and might
even have been necessary. But when the rules of pleading changed
to reflect modern times, the doctrine of judicial estoppel was no
longer necessary to protect those interests. Moreover, the doctrine
conflicts with the policies behind the changed rules of pleading and
is capable of working great injustices on litigants. Some courts have
recognized these problems and have refused to apply the rule;
others stubbornly hold on to it. But modern rules of evidence and
attorney/litigant sanctions provide far better methods of protecting
the interests thatjudicial estoppel sought to protect, while promot-
ing the deeper policies behind the modern systems of pleading. For
those reasons, judicial estoppel is a policy whose time has come and
gone, and it, like common law and code pleading, should be
consigned to the history books in any jurisdiction whose pleading
system substantially parallels the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Alternatively, a new defense could be added to the doctrine: that
the party against whom the estoppel is asserted did not have a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue underlying the positions it
wishes to assert.28 2 This may explain Montana's requirement that
the party to be estopped must have had full knowledge of the facts
at the time of the prior pleading, 283 and Utah's requirement that
the parties possess unequal knowledge of the facts.284 In doing
so, however, a jurisdiction would run the risk of having judicial
estoppel subsumed by collateral estoppel, as seems to have occurred
in Idaho already.
285
281 See 59 U.S.L.W. at 4598-99.
282 See supra notes 144, 222 and accompanying text.
28S See Rowland v. Klies, 223 Mont. 360, 367-68, 726 P.2d 310, 315-16 (1986).
284 See Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503-04 (Ct. App. Utah 1989).
285 See Rajspic v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 104 Idaho 662, 664 n.1, 662 P.2d 534,
536 n.1 (1983).
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APPENDIX
The following table notes the rejection or acceptance ofjudicial
estoppel by each state, and the criteria for use of judicial estoppel
in those states that accept the doctrine.
28 6
State Judicial Prior Reliance Prejudice
Estoppel Success
Ala. 287  Yes Unclear Yes Yes
Alaska288  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ariz. 289  Yes Yes Yes Unclear
Ark. 2 9  Yes Unclear Unclear Unclear
Cal.2 9 1  Yes Yes
Colo. 2 92  Unclear
Conn.29 3  No
Del.29 Yes
D.C. 2 9 5  No
28
6 A blank space indicates that the question has not been addressed in that state.
287 See Hendricks v. Blake, 291 Ala. 575, 580, 285 So.2d 82, 86 (1973) (holding
that judicial estoppel should never be used offensively)
21s SeeJamison v. Consolidated Utilities, Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 101-03 (Alaska 1978)
(holding that changed facts would constitute a defense).
289 See Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State of Arizona, 114 Ariz. 480, 483-484, 562
P.2d 360, 363-64 (1977) (declining to decide if identity of parties was required).
2o See Muncrief v. Green, 251 Ark. 580, 583-84, 473 S.W.2d 907, 900 (1971)
(requiring that the parties be the same).
V See Ng v. Hudson, 75 Cal. App. 3d 250, 258, 142 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74-75 (1977).
Althoughjudicial estoppel is accepted in California, the requirements are still unclear.
292 See Waitkus v. Pomeroy, 506 P.2d 392, 397 (Col. Ct. App. 1972). The court
appears to have confused the doctrine with collateral estoppel because they cite
Louisiana cases for the doctrine, and Louisiana no longer permits the use of the
doctrine. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
2 93 See Rogers Investment Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 161 Conn. 6, 10-11, 282
A.2d 882, 884-85 (1971) (holding that prior claims were admissible but could be
explained away).
M4 See Kesterton v. American Casualty Co., No. 83 E-De-93, slip op. at 269, 276
(Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 1988) (L.XIS, States library, Del file). The court, however,
does not explain its requirements.
295 See Plough, Inc. v. National Academy of Sciences, 530 A.2d 1152, 1159 n.10
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State Judicial Prior Reliance Prejudice
Estoppel Success
Fla.296  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ga.
Haw.297  Yes Yes Yes
Idaho29 8  Yes Yes Yes Yes
ll.29 9  Yes Yes
Ind.30°  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Iowa 01  Yes Yes
Kan.30 2  Yes Unclear Yes Unclear
Ky.303  Yes
La.304  No
Me.305  Unclear
(D.C. 1987) (accepting Konstantinidis).
26 See Chase & Co. v. Little, 116 Fla. 667, 671-72, 156 So. 609, 610-11 (1934)
(requiring same parties and not allowing mistake or inadvertence defenses).
See Rosa v. CWJ Contractors, Ltd., 4 Haw. App. 210, 218-20, 664 P.2d 745,
751-52 (1983).
298 See Ross v. Ross, 103 Idaho 406, 408-09, 648 P.2d 1119, 1121-22 (1982)
(requiring same issues and parties). But see Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co., 104 Idaho 662, 664 n.1, 662 P.2d 534, 536 n.1 (1983) (saying that judicial
estoppel is the same as collateral estoppel).
See Finley v. Kesling, 105 1. App. 3d 1, 8-10,433 N.E.2d 1112, 1118-19 (1982).
3oo See Tobin v. McClellan, 225 Ind. 335, 344-47, 73 N.E.2d 679, 684-85 (1947)
(also stating that this was estoppel by conduct). The court required that the prior
assertion have been "acted on by [the] court."
301 See Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Insurance Co., 405 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa
1987) (requiring an attempt by the party to mislead the court).
-"2 See McClintock v. McCall, 214 Kan. 764, 766-67, 522 P.2d 343, 346 (1974)
(requiring same parties).
IV! See Norrell v. Electric & Water Plant Board of the City of Frankfort, 557
S.W.2d 900, 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (requiring same parties but not otherwise
explaining requirements).
s See Doyle v. State Farm (Mutual) Insurance Co., 414 So.2d 763, 765 (La. 1982).
o See Begin v. Town of Sabattus, 409 A.2d 1269, 1271-72 (Me. 1979) (criticizing
a doctrine similar to judicial estoppel on the basis of a rule like FED. R. Crv. P.
8(e)(2))
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State Judicial Prior Reliance Prejudice
Estoppel Success
Md.A0 6  Unclear
Mass.3 0 7  No
Mich.3 ° s  Yes Yes
Minn.30 9  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Miss.3 10  Yes
Mo.3 11  Unclear
Mont.3 12  Yes
Neb.3 13  Unclear
Nev.3 1 4  Yes
N.H.
NJ.s i15Yes Yes Yes
306 See Messal v. Merlands Club Inc., 244 Md. 18, 29-31, 222 A.2d 627, 633-34
(1966) (requiring, at least, the same parties; may have been confused with res
judicata).
307 See Brown v. Gerstein, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 558,568 n.19, 460 N.E.2d 1043, 1051
n.19 (1984).
3s See Lichon v. American Universal Ins. Co., 435 Mich. 408,415-17,459 N.W.2d
288, 293 (1990).
309 See Minnesota State Board of Health by Lawson v. Brainerd, 308 Minn 24, 28
n.1, 241 N.W.2d 624, 627 n.1 (1976) (appearing to apply only within "a single
litigation").
310 See Hoover v. Mississippi, 552 So.2d 834, 838 (Miss. 1989) (requiring same
parties).
311 See Edwards v. Durham, 346 S.W.2d 90, 101 (Mo. 1961) (mentioning but not
applying the doctrine). But see, Bellinger v. Boatman's Nat'l Bank, 779 S.W.2d 647,
650-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that the doctrine applies to "facts stated under
oath, during the course of a trial").
312 See Rowland v. Klies, 223 Mont. 360, 367-69, 726 P.2d 310, 315-16 (1986)
(holding that pleadings, without court action, are enough to estop but requiring full
knowledge of facts at time of pleading).
313 The doctrine was mentioned in Rosnick v. Dinsmore, 235 Neb. 738, 751, 457
N.W.2d 793, 801 (1990). The Nebraska Supreme Court, however, appears to have
been speaking of collateral estoppel. See id. at 752, 457 N.W.2d at 801.
314 See Sterling Builders, Inc. v. Fuhrman, 80 Nev. 543, 547-48, 396 P.2d 850, 853
(1964) (holding that pleadings, without court actions, are enough to estop).
s1r See Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc., 581 A.2d 91, 107-08 (N.J. Super. Ct.
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State Judicial Prior Reliance Prejudice
Estoppel Success
N.M. 16  Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.Y.3 17  Yes Yes No
N.C.
N.D.
Ohio3 18  Yes Yes
Okla.3 1 9  Yes
Or.3 20  No
Pa.3 21  Yes Yes
R.I.3 22  Unclear
S.C.3 23  No
S.D.3 24  Yes
Tenn.3 25  Yes
Tex.3 26  Yes Yes Yes
1990).
316 See Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 96 N.M. 409, 413-14, 631 P.2d 315, 319-20
(N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (may require same parties).
317 See Kimco of N.Y., Inc. v. Devon, 558 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
3 18 See Woodland Market Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, No. 35526, slip op.
(Ohio Ct. App. April 7, 1977). The court required, however, that there have been
only a prior determination by a court of competentjurisdiction, and did not mention
inconsistent assertions. Thus it may have been discussing collateral estoppel.
319 See Panama Process, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276, 286 (Okla. 1990).
320 SeeJarvis v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 227 Or. 508, 515-18, 363
P.2d 740, 743-44 (1961) (citing Parkinson and adopting the use of the positions as
evidence).
321 See Associated Hosp. Serv. v. Pustilnik, 497 Pa. 221, 439 A.2d 1149, 1151-52
(1981).
322 See Gross v. Glazier, 495 A.2d 672, 674-75 (R.I. 1985) (mentioning judicial
estoppel).
See MacFarlane v. Manly, 274 S.C. 392, 395, 264 S.E.2d 838, 839-40 (1980).
3 24 See Warren Supply Co. v. Duerr, Philey, Thorsheim Dev., Inc., 355 N.W.2d 838,
840-41 (S.D. 1984) (also applying the doctrine to settlements).
32 See Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn. 633, 647, 653, 266 S.W. 313,
317 (1924).
32 See Herd Corp. v. Triple "J" Investments, Inc., No. B14-86-506-CV, slip op. at
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State Judicial Prior Reliance Prejudice
Estoppel Success
Utah 27  Yes Yes Yes
Vt.3 28  Unclear
Va.3 29  Yes Yes Yes
Wash. 3 °  Yes Yes Yes Yes
W. Va.
Wis.331 Yes
WY. 2 yes No _
8 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1987).
2 See Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (requiring
that parties had unequal knowledge of facts).
See Estate of Raedel, 152 Vt. 478, 481 n.1, 568 A.2d 331, 332 n.1. (1989)
(combining doctrine with collateral estoppel).
329 See Maxey v. Doe, 217 Va. 22, 25, 225 S.E.2d 359, 361 (1976) (also requiring
knowledge of all options). But see Ferebee v. Hungate, 192 Va. 32, 35-36, 63 S.E.2d
761, 763-64 (1951) (requiring same parties); Gilmer v. Brown, 186 Va. 630, 636-37,
44 S.E.2d 16, 18-19 (1947) (holding that judicial estoppel was the same as res
judicata).
330 See Raymond v. Ingrain, 47 Wash. App. 781, 784-85, 737 P.2d 314,316 (1987)
(also requiring same parties).
331 See Jung v. Grundahl, No. 90-0632, slip op. at 924 (Wisc. Ct. App. Oct. 31,
1990) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc. file) (applying the doctrine to appeals within the
same case).
332 See Zwemmer v. Production Credit Assoc., 792 P.2d 245, 245 (Wyo. 1990).
